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Complexity of non-monotonic learning
Traditionally most of the work in the ﬁeld of Inductive Logic Programming (ILP) has ad-
dressed the problem of learning Prolog programs. On the other hand, Answer Set Program-
ming is increasingly being used as a powerful language for knowledge representation and 
reasoning, and is also gaining increasing attention in industry. Consequently, the research 
activity in ILP has widened to the area of Answer Set Programming, witnessing the pro-
posal of several new learning frameworks that have extended ILP to learning answer set 
programs. In this paper, we investigate the theoretical properties of these existing frame-
works for learning programs under the answer set semantics. Speciﬁcally, we present a 
detailed analysis of the computational complexity of each of these frameworks with re-
spect to the two decision problems of deciding whether a hypothesis is a solution of a 
learning task and deciding whether a learning task has any solutions. We introduce a new 
notion of generality of a learning framework, which enables us to deﬁne a framework to be 
more general than another in terms of being able to distinguish one ASP hypothesis solution 
from a set of incorrect ASP programs. Based on this notion, we formally prove a generality 
relation over the set of existing frameworks for learning programs under answer set se-
mantics. In particular, we show that our recently proposed framework, Context-dependent 
Learning from Ordered Answer Sets, is more general than brave induction, induction of stable 
models, and cautious induction, and maintains the same complexity as cautious induction, 
which has the highest complexity of these frameworks.
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the 
CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Over the last two decades there has been a growing interest in Inductive Logic Programming (ILP) [1], where the goal 
is to learn a logic program called a hypothesis, which together with a given background knowledge base, explains a set 
of examples. The main advantage that ILP has over traditional statistical machine learning approaches is that the learned 
hypotheses can be easily expressed in plain English and explained to a human user, so facilitating a closer interaction be-
tween humans and machines. Traditional ILP frameworks have focused on learning deﬁnite logic programs [1–6] and normal 
logic programs [7,8]. On the other hand, Answer Set Programming [9] is a powerful language for knowledge representation 
and reasoning. ASP is closely related to other declarative paradigms such as SAT, SMT and Constraint Programming, which 
have each been used for inductive reasoning [10–12]. Compared with these other paradigms, due to its non-monotonicity, 
ASP is particularly suited for common-sense reasoning [13–15]. Because of its expressiveness and eﬃcient solving, ASP is 
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(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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product conﬁguration [19]. Consequently, the scope of ILP has recently been extended to learning answer set programs from 
examples of partial solutions of a given problem, with the intention being to provide algorithms that support automated 
learning of complex declarative knowledge. Learning ASP programs allows us to learn a variety of declarative non-monotonic, 
common-sense theories, including for instance Event Calculus [20] theories [21] and theories for scheduling problems and 
agents’ preference models, both from real user data [22] and from synthetic data [23,24].
Learning ASP programs has several advantages when compared to learning Prolog programs. Firstly, when learning Prolog 
programs, the goal directed SLDNF procedure of Prolog must be taken into account. Speciﬁcally, when learning programs 
with negation, it must be ensured that the programs are stratiﬁed, or otherwise the learned program may loop under 
certain queries. As ASP is declarative, no such consideration need be taken into account when learning ASP programs. A 
second, more fundamental advantage of learning ASP programs, is that the theory learned can be expressed using extra 
types of rules that are not available in Prolog, such as choice rules and weak constraints. Learning choice rules allows us to 
learn non-deterministic concepts; for instance, we may learn that a coin may non-deterministically land on either heads or 
tails, but never both. This could be achieved by learning the simple choice rule 1{heads,tails}1. Learning choice rules 
is different from probabilistic ILP settings such as [25–27] where, in similar coins problems the focus would be on learning 
the probabilities of the two outcomes of are coin. Learning weak constraints enables a natural extension of ILP to preference 
learning [23], which has resulted to be effective in problem domains such as learning preference models for scheduling [23]
and for urban mobility [24].
Several algorithms, aimed at learning under the answer set semantics, and different frameworks for learning ASP pro-
grams have been recently introduced in the literature. [28] presented the notions of brave induction (I L Pb) and cautious 
induction (I L Pc), based respectively on the well established notions of entailment under the answer set semantics [13,29]
of brave entailment (when an atom is true in at least one answer set) and cautious entailment (when and an atom is true in 
all answer sets). In brave induction, at least one answer set must cover the examples, whereas in cautious induction, every 
answer set must cover the examples. Brave induction is actually a special case of an earlier learning framework, called in-
duction of stable models (I L Psm) [30], in which examples are partial interpretations. A hypothesis is a solution of an induction 
of stable models task if for each of the example partial interpretations, there is an answer set of the hypothesis combined 
with the background knowledge, that covers that partial interpretation. Brave induction is equivalent to induction of stable 
models with exactly one (partial interpretation) example.
Each of the above frameworks for learning ASP programs is unable to learn some types of ASP programs [31]; for exam-
ple, brave induction alone cannot learn programs containing hard constraints. In [31], we presented a learning framework, 
called Learning from Answer Sets (I L P LAS ), which uniﬁes brave and cautious induction and is able to learn ASP programs 
containing normal rules, choice rules and hard constraints. In spite of the increased expressivity, none of the above ap-
proaches can learn weak constraints, which are able to capture preference learning. Informally, learning weak constraints 
consists on identifying conditions for ordering answer sets. The learning task in this case would require examples of or-
derings over partial interpretations. To tackle this aspect of learning ASP programs, we have extended the Learning from 
Answer Sets framework to Learning from Ordered Answer Sets (I L P LO AS ) [23] and demonstrated that our algorithm1 is able 
to learn preferences in a scheduling domain. More recently, we have extended the I L P LO AS framework to I L P contextLO AS , with 
context-dependent examples, which come together with extra contextual information [24].
In this paper, we explore both the expressive power and the computational complexity of each framework. The former 
is important, as it allows us to identify the class of problems that each framework can solve, whereas the latter gives 
an indication of the price paid for using each framework. We characterise the expressive power of a framework in terms 
of new notions called one-to-one-distinguishability, one-to-many-distinguishability and many-to-many-distinguishability. The 
intuition of one-to-one-distinguishability is that, given some ﬁxed background knowledge B and suﬃcient examples, the 
framework should be able to distinguish a target hypotheses H1 from another, unwanted, hypotheses H2. This means that 
there should be at least one task T (of the given framework) with background knowledge B , such that H1 is a solution 
of T , and H2 is not. We characterise the one-to-one-distinguishability class of a framework F (written D11(F)) as the set of 
tuples 〈B, H1, H2〉 for such B ’s, H1’s and H2’s, and state that a framework F1 is more D11-general than another F2 if F2’s 
one-to-one-distinguishability class is a strict subset of F1’s one-to-one-distinguishability class.
One-to-many-distinguishability relates to the task of ﬁnding a single target hypothesis from within a set of possi-
ble hypotheses. It upgrades the notion of one-to-one-distinguishability classes to one-to-many-distinguishability classes. 
These are tuples of the form 〈B, H, S〉 for which a framework has at least one task that includes H and none of the 
(unwanted) hypotheses in S as an inductive solution. Many-to-many-distinguishability upgrades this notion to many-to-
many-distinguishability classes. These contain tuples of the form 〈B, S1, S2〉, where S1 is a set of target hypotheses, for 
which a framework must have a task that accepts each hypothesis in S1 and no hypothesis in S2 as inductive solution. We 
show that, under these three measures, I L P contextLO AS is more general than I L P LO AS , which is more general than I L P LAS . We 
also show that I L P LAS is more general than both I L Psm and I L Pc . Although I L Psm is equally D11-general to I L Pb , we show 
that I L Psm is more general than I L Pb under the one-to-many and many-to-many generality measures.
1 Our ILASP system for solving I L P LO AS tasks is available for download from [32].
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of all four frameworks is the same, both for the decision problem of verifying that a given hypothesis is a solution of a 
given learning task, and for the problem of deciding whether a given learning task has any solutions. Similarly, we also 
show that I L Psm and I L Pb have the same computational complexities for both decision problems, despite the former being 
more general than the latter under two of our generality measures.
We begin, in Section 2, by reviewing the background material necessary for the rest of the paper. In Section 3 we recall 
the deﬁnitions of each of the learning frameworks and in Sections 4 and 5 we prove the complexities and generalities 
(respectively) of each learning framework. We conclude the paper with a discussion of the related and future work.
2. Background
2.1. Answer Set Programming
In this section we introduce the concepts needed in the paper. Given any atoms h,h1, . . . ,hk,b1, . . . ,bn,c1, . . . ,cm , 
h :- b1, . . . ,bn,not c1, . . . ,not cm is called a normal rule, with h as the head and b1, . . . ,bn,not c1, . . . ,not cm (col-
lectively) as the body (“not” represents negation as failure); a rule :- b1, . . . ,bn,not c1, . . . ,not cm , with an empty head, 
is a hard constraint; a choice rule is a rule l{h1, . . . ,hk}u← b1, . . . ,bn,not c1, . . . ,not cm (where l and u are integers) 
and its head is called an aggregate. A rule R is safe if each variable in R occurs in at least one positive literal in the body of 
R . In this paper we will use ASPch to denote the set of choice programs P , which are programs composed of safe normal 
rules, choice rules, and hard constraints. Given a rule R , we will write head(R) to denote the head of R , body(R) to denote 
the body of R and body+ (resp. body−(R)) to denote the atoms that occur positively (resp. negatively) in the body of R . 
Given a program P , we will also write Atoms(P ) to denote the atoms in P . We will also extend this notation to fragments 
of a program.
The Herbrand Base of any program P ∈ ASPch , denoted HBP , is the set of variable free (ground) atoms that can be 
formed from predicates and constants in P . The subsets of HBP are called the (Herbrand) interpretations of P . A ground 
aggregate l{h1, . . . ,hk}u is satisﬁed by an interpretation I iff l ≤ |I ∩ {h1, . . . ,hk}| ≤ u.
As we restrict our programs to sets of normal rules, (hard) constraints and choice rules, we can use the simpliﬁed 
deﬁnitions of the reduct for choice rules presented in [33]. Given a program P and an Herbrand interpretation I ⊆ HBP , 
the reduct P I is constructed from ground(P ) (the set of ground instances of rules in P ) in 4 steps: ﬁrstly, remove rules 
whose bodies contain the negation of an atom in I; secondly, remove all negative literals from the remaining rules; thirdly, 
replace the head of any hard constraint, or any choice rule whose head is not satisﬁed by I with ⊥ (where ⊥ /∈ HBP ); 
and ﬁnally, replace any remaining choice rule l{h1, . . . ,hm}u:- b1, . . . ,bn with the set of rules {hi:- b1, . . . ,bn | hi ∈
I ∩ {h1, . . . ,hm}}. Any I ⊆ HBP is an answer set of P if it is the minimal model of the reduct P I . Throughout the paper we 
denote the set of answer sets of a program P with AS(P ).
We say a program P bravely entails an atom a (written P |=b a) if there is at least one answer set A of P such that 
a ∈ A. Similarly, P cautiously entails a (written P |=c a) if for every answer set A of P , a ∈ A.
Unlike hard constraints in ASP, weak constraints do not affect what is, or is not, an answer set of a program P . 
Hence the above deﬁnitions also apply to programs with weak constraints. Weak constraints create an ordering 
over AS(P ) specifying which answer sets are “preferred” to others. A weak constraint is of the form :∼ b1, . . . ,bn,
not c1, . . . ,not cm.[w@l,t1, . . . ,tk] where b1, . . . ,bn , c1, . . . ,cm are atoms, w and l are terms specifying the weight
and the level, and t1, . . . ,tk are terms. A weak constraint W is safe if every variable in W occurs in at least one 
positive literal in the body of W . At each priority level l, the aim is to discard any answer set which does not min-
imise the sum of the weights of the ground weak constraints with level l whose bodies are true. The higher levels 
are minimised ﬁrst. The terms t1, . . . ,tk specify which ground weak constraints should be considered unique [34]. 
For any program P and an interpretation A, weak(P , A) is the set of tuples (w,l,t1, . . . ,tk) for which there is some 
:∼ b1, . . . ,bn,not c1, . . . ,not cm.[w@l,t1, . . . ,tk] in ground(P ) such that A satisﬁes b1, . . . ,bn,not c1, . . . ,not cm . 
For each level l, the score of the interpretation A is the sum of the weights of tuples with level l, formally PlA =∑
(w,l,t1,...,tk)∈weak(P ,A) w . For A1, A2 ∈ AS(P ), A1 dominates A2 (written A1 P A2) iff ∃l such that PlA1 < PlA2 and ∀m > l, PmA1 = PmA2 . An answer set A ∈ AS(P ) is optimal if it is not dominated by any A2 ∈ AS(P ).
Example 1. Let P be the program {0{p(1),p(2),p(3)}1.}. P has 8 answer sets, which are the various combinations of 
making each of the three p atoms true or false. Consider the two weak constraints :∼ p(X).[1@1] and :∼ p(X).[1@1,X]. 
The ﬁrst weak constraint states that if any of the p atoms is true then a penalty of one must be paid. This penalty is only 
paid once, regardless whether 1, 2 or 3 of the p atoms are true. Conversely, the second weak constraint says that a penalty 
of 1 must be paid for each of the p atoms that is true. In both cases, ∅ is the only optimal answer set; however, in the ﬁrst 
case, none of the remaining answer sets dominate each other, whereas in the second case, the answer sets with only one p
atom dominate those with 2 p atoms, which in turn each dominate the single answer set with 3 p atoms.
Note that the deﬁnition of weak constraints used in this paper is in line with the recent ASP standard established in [34]. 
The syntax of some previous deﬁnitions of weak constraints such as [13] do not include the terms t1, . . . ,tk and considered 
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straints in [34]. Any weak constraint :∼ body.[w : l]2 can be mapped to the weak constraint :∼ body.[w@l,V1, . . . ,Vn], 
where V1, . . . ,Vn is the set of all variables that occur in body. If there are multiple weak constraints, to exactly preserve the 
semantics of [13], a unique term must be added to each weak constraint. For example, {:∼ p(X).[1 : 1]; :∼ q(X).[1 : 1]}
would become {:∼ p(X).[1@1,X,1]; :∼ q(X).[1@1,X,2]}. With this additional term, Weak(P , {p(a), q(a)}) (where P is 
the program containing the two weak constraints) would be equal to {(1,1,a,1), (1,1,a,2)}, leading to a score of 2 at 
level 1; without the additional term, Weak(P , {p(a), q(a)}) would equal {(1,1,a)}, leading to a score of 1 at level 1.
Unless otherwise stated, when we refer to an ASP program in this paper, we mean a program consisting of a ﬁnite set 
of normal rules, choice rules, hard and weak constraints.
We now introduce some extra notation which will be useful in later sections. Given a set of interpretations S , the 
set ord(P , S) captures the ordering of the interpretations given by the weak constraints in P . It generalises the dom-
inates relation; so it not only includes 〈A1, A2, <〉 if A1 P A2, but it also includes tuples for other binary compari-
son operators. Formally, 〈A1, A2, <〉 ∈ ord(P , S) if A1, A2 ∈ S and A1 P A2; 〈A1, A2, >〉 ∈ ord(P , S) if A1, A2 ∈ S and 
A2 P A1; 〈A1, A2, ≤〉 ∈ ord(P , S) if A1, A2 ∈ S and A2 P A1; 〈A1, A2, ≥〉 ∈ ord(P , S) if A1, A2 ∈ S and A1 P A2; 
〈A1, A2, =〉 ∈ ord(P , S) if A1, A2 ∈ S , A1 P A2 and A2 P A1; 〈A1, A2, =〉 ∈ ord(P , S) if A1, A2 ∈ S and A1 P A2 or 
A2 P A1. Given an ASP program, we write ord(P ) as a shorthand for ord(P , AS(P )). Two ASP programs P and Q are 
strongly equivalent (written P ≡s Q ) if for every ASP program R , AS(P ∪ R) = AS(Q ∪ R).
We now recall the splitting set theorem from [35], which we use in the proofs throughout the paper. This theorem relies 
on the notions of a splitting set and the partial evaluation of a logic program. Given a program P , a set U ⊆ HBP is a 
splitting set of P if and only if for every rule R ∈ ground(P ) such that Atoms(head(R)) ∩ U = ∅, Atoms(R) ⊆ U . Given a 
ground rule R and a set of atoms U , we write R\U to denote the rule R with all (positive or negative) occurrences of atoms 
in U removed from the body of R . Given a program P a splitting set U of P and a set X ⊆ U , the partial evaluation of P
with respect to U and X , written eU (P , X), is the program {R\U | R ∈ ground(P ), Atoms(head(R)) ∩U = ∅, (body+(R) ∩U ) ⊆
X, body−(R) ∩ X = ∅}.
Theorem 1. Given any ground ASP program P , and splitting set U of P , AS(P ) = {X ∪ Y | X ∈ AS({R ∈ P | Atoms(head(R)) ∩ U =
∅}), Y ∈ AS(eU (P , X))}.
The intuition behind the splitting set theorem is that if a set of atoms U is known to split the program P , then we can 
ﬁnd the answer sets of the subprogram that deﬁnes the atoms in U ﬁrst. For each of these answer sets X , we can partially 
evaluate P using X and solve this partially evaluated program for answer sets. The splitting set theorem then guarantees 
that for each answer set Y of the partially evaluated program, X ∪ Y is an answer set of P . Furthermore, every answer set 
of P can be constructed in this way.
2.2. Complexity theory
We assume the reader is familiar with the fundamental concepts of complexity, such as Turing machines and reductions; 
for a detailed explanation, see [36].
Many of the decision problems for ASP are known to be complete for classes in the polynomial hierarchy [37]. The 
classes of the polynomial hierarchy are deﬁned as follows: P is the class of all problems which can be solved in polynomial 
time by a Deterministic Turing Machine (DTM); P0 = P0 = P0 = P ; Pk+1 = P
P
k is the class of all problems which can be 




k is the class of all problems which can be solved by a 




k is the class of all problems 





are NP and co-NP (respectively), where NP is the class of problems which can be solved by a non-deterministic Turing 
machine in polynomial time and co-NP is the class of problems whose complement is an N P problem.
DP is the class of problems D that can be mapped to a pair of problems D1 and D2 such that D1 ∈ NP , D2 ∈ co-NP , 
and for each instance I of D , I answers “yes” if and only if both of the mapped instances I1 and I2 (of D1 and D2, 
respectively) answer “yes”. It is well known [36] that the following inclusions hold: P ⊆ NP ⊆ DP ⊆ P2 ⊆ P2 and P ⊆
co-NP ⊆ DP ⊆ P2 ⊆ P2 .
3. Learning frameworks
In this section, we give the deﬁnitions of the six learning frameworks we analyse in this paper. The ﬁrst three – brave 
induction, cautious induction and induction of stable models – are not our own. We reformulate, but preserve the meaning 
of, the original deﬁnitions for easier comparison with our own.
2 In [13] “:” was used for the same purpose as “@”.
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of the hypothesis space is two-fold: ﬁrstly, it allows the task to be restricted to those solutions which are in some way 
interesting; secondly, it aids the computational search for inductive solutions. Tasks for brave and cautious induction and 
for induction of stable models were originally presented with no hypothesis space [28,30] as they were mainly considered 
theoretically without the speciﬁcations of eﬃcient algorithmic computations. The only publicly available algorithms for brave 
induction [38,39] make use of a hypothesis space deﬁned by mode declarations [40]. In this paper, we “upgrade” each of 
brave induction, cautious induction and induction of stable models with a hypothesis space SM .
3.1. Notation and terminology
An ILP learning framework F deﬁnes what a learning task of F is and what an inductive solution is for a given learning 
task of F . For each framework a task is a tuple 〈B, SM , E〉, where B is an ASP program called the background knowledge, SM
is a set of ASP rules called the hypothesis space, and E is a tuple called the examples. The structure of E depends on the 
type of ILP framework. Each of the papers [28], [30], [31] and [23] presented learning frameworks with different languages 
for B and SM ; for example, induction of stable models was presented only for normal logic programs. It would be unfair to 
say that induction from stable models is not general enough to learn programs with choice rules, simply because they were 
not considered in the original paper (in fact, induction from stable models is general enough to learn some programs with 
choice rules). For a fair comparison we therefore assume in this paper that every learning framework has a background 
knowledge B and hypothesis space SM that consist of normal rules, choice rules, hard constraints and weak constraints.
Given a framework F and a learning task TF = 〈B, SM , E〉 of F , a hypothesis is any subset of the hypothesis space SM . 
In Section 5, we consider tasks with unrestricted hypothesis spaces (written 〈B, E〉), in which case any ASP program can 
be called a hypothesis. An inductive solution is a hypothesis that, together with the background knowledge B , satisﬁes some 
conditions on E (given by the particular learning framework F ). We write I L PF (TF ) to denote the set of all inductive 
solutions of TF . Throughout the paper, we use the term covers to apply to any kind of example: i.e. given a F task 
〈B, SM , E〉, we say that a hypothesis H covers an example e (any element of any component of E), if it meets the particular 
conditions that the framework F puts on H and e.
3.2. Framework deﬁnitions
Brave induction (I L Pb), ﬁrst presented in [28], deﬁnes an inductive task in which all examples are ground atoms that 
should be covered in at least one answer set, i.e. entailed under brave entailment in ASP. The original deﬁnition did not 
consider atoms which should not be present in an answer set, namely negative examples. The two publicly available algo-
rithms that realise brave induction, on the other hand, do allow for negative examples. We therefore upgrade the deﬁnition 
in this paper to allow negative examples3 as follows.
Deﬁnition 1. A brave induction (I L Pb) task Tb is a tuple 〈B, SM , 〈E+, E−〉〉, where B is an ASP program called the back-
ground knowledge, SM is the hypothesis space and E+ and E− are sets of ground atoms called the positive and negative 
examples (respectively). A hypothesis H ⊆ SM is said to be an inductive solution of Tb (written H ∈ I L Pb(Tb)) if and only if 
∃A ∈ AS(B ∪ H) such that E+ ⊆ A and E− ∩ A = ∅.
Cautious induction (I L Pc) was also ﬁrst presented in [28]. It deﬁnes an inductive task where all of the examples should 
be covered in every answer set (i.e. entailed under cautious entailment in ASP) and that B ∪ H should be satisﬁable (have 
at least one answer set). Similarly to brave induction, the original deﬁnition did not consider negative examples, but in 
Deﬁnition 2 we upgrade the framework to include negative examples.
Deﬁnition 2. A cautious induction (I L Pc ) task Tc is a tuple 〈B, SM , 〈E+, E−〉〉, where B is an ASP program called the back-
ground knowledge, SM is the hypothesis space and E+ and E− are sets of ground atoms called the positive and negative 
examples (respectively). A hypothesis H ⊆ SM is said to be an inductive solution of Tc (written H ∈ I L Pc(Tc)) if and only if 
AS(B ∪ H) = ∅ and ∀A ∈ AS(B ∪ H), E+ ⊆ A and E− ∩ A = ∅.
Brave induction alone can only reason about what should be true (or false) in a single answer set of B ∪ H . It cannot 
specify other brave tasks such as enforcing that two atoms are both bravely entailed, but not necessarily in the same 
answer set. Induction of stable models [30] (I L Psm), on the other hand, generalises the notion of brave induction as shown in 
Deﬁnition 4. The following terminology is ﬁrst introduced.
Deﬁnition 3. A partial interpretation e is a pair of sets of ground atoms 〈einc, eexc〉. An interpretation I is said to extend e iff 
einc ⊆ I and eexc ∩ I = ∅.
3 Note that in I L Pb a negative example ei can be easily simulated by adding a rule ai:- not ei to the background knowledge and giving ai as a 
positive example (where ai is a new atom (unique to ei) which does not appear anywhere in the original task).
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background knowledge, SM is the hypothesis space and E is a set of partial interpretations called the examples. A hypothesis 
H is said to be an inductive solution of Tsm (written H ∈ I L Psm(Tsm)) if and only if H ⊆ SM and ∀e ∈ E , ∃A ∈ AS(B ∪ H)
such that A extends e.
Note that a brave induction task can be thought of as a special case of induction of stable models, with exactly one 
(partial interpretation) example.
We now consider the Learning from Answer Sets framework introduced in [31]. This is the ﬁrst framework capable of 
unifying the concepts of brave and cautious induction. The idea is to use examples of partial interpretations which should 
or should not be extended by answer sets of B ∪ H .
Deﬁnition 5. A Learning from Answer Sets task is a tuple T = 〈B, SM , 〈E+, E−〉〉 where B is an ASP program called the back-
ground knowledge, SM is the hypothesis space and E+ and E− are sets of partial interpretations called, respectively, the 
positive and negative examples. A hypothesis H ⊆ SM is an inductive solution of T (written H ∈ I L P LAS(T )) if and only if:
1. ∀e+ ∈ E+ ∃A ∈ AS(B ∪ H) such that A extends e+
2. ∀e− ∈ E− A ∈ AS(B ∪ H) such that A extends e−
Note that this deﬁnition combines properties of both the brave and cautious semantics: the positive examples must each 
be bravely entailed, whereas the negation of each negative example must be cautiously entailed.
Example 2. Consider an I L P LAS learning task whose background knowledge B contains deﬁnitions of the structure of a
4x4 Sudoku board; i.e. deﬁnitions of cell, same_row, same_col and same_block (where same_row, same_col and 




cell((1,1)). cell((1,2)). . . . cell((4,4)).
same_row((X1,Y), (X2,Y)):- cell((X1,Y)),cell((X2,Y)),X1 = X2.
same_col((X,Y1), (X,Y2)):- cell((X,Y1)),cell((X,Y2)),Y1 = Y2.
block((1,1),1). block((1,2),1). block((2,1),1). block((2,2),1).
block((3,1),2). block((3,2),2). block((4,1),2). block((4,2),2).
block((1,3),3). block((1,4),3). block((2,3),3). block((2,4),3).
block((3,3),4). block((3,4),4). block((4,3),4). block((4,4),4).
same_block(C1,C2):- block(C1,B),block(C2,B),C1 = C2.
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
























We need to be able to say that there should be at least one answer set that assigns a value to a cell, or otherwise the 
empty hypothesis would be suﬃcient. This is captured by our positive example which causes at least one of the choice 
rules to be part of a solution in order to be covered. Our ﬁrst three negative examples require the three constraints to 
be also included in a solution. Without each one of these negative examples, at least one constraint could be left out of 
the solution. The fourth negative example means that the upper bound of the counting aggregate in the choice rule must 
be 1, as otherwise there would be answer sets in which cell (1,1) was assigned to both 1 and 2. Finally, the ﬁfth negative 
4 A larger version of this learning task with a hypothesis space with 542 rules can be found in the manual for our learning algorithm, ILASP [41].
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The only other solutions within the hypothesis space SM are those that contain H and also extra redundant choice rules, 
such as 0{value(C,1),value(C,2), value(C,3),value(C,4)}1:- cell(C).
Note that we need I L P LAS ’s combination of brave and cautious induction to separate the correct hypothesis from the 
incorrect hypotheses.
• If we instead use brave induction, whichever examples we use, if H is a solution, then any of the choice 
rules on their own is also a solution. For instance, consider the hypothesis H ′ , containing only the choice rule 
0{value(C,1),value(C,2), value(C,3),value(C,4)}1:- cell(C). For any examples 〈E+, E−〉 such that H ∈
I L Pb(〈B, 〈E+, E−〉〉), there must be an answer set A of B ∪ H such that E+ ⊆ A and E− ∩ A = ∅. As AS(B ∪ H) ⊂
AS(B ∪ H ′), any such answer set is also an answer set of B ∪ H ′; and hence, H ′ is also a solution of the task.
• If we use cautious induction, we have to give examples which are either true in every answer set, or false in every 
answer set. Therefore, we could not give any examples about the value predicate – for each atom value(x,y) (where 
x and y range from 1 to 4), there is at least one answer set of B ∪ H that contains value(x,y) and at least one that 
does not; this means that if value(x,y) is given as either a positive or negative example, H will not be a solution of 
the task.
This means that for any I L Pc task Tc such that H is a solution, any subset of the hypothesis space SM is also a solution 
of Tc .
Note that none of the learning frameworks we have considered so far (I L P LAS included) can incentivise learning a weak 
constraint. This is because the frameworks only have examples of what should be in some, all or none of the answer sets 
of B ∪ H . Any solution H containing a weak constraint W will have the same answer sets with W removed and H\{W }
would therefore be a shorter (more optimal5) solution. The notion of ordering examples is needed to incentivise learning 
weak constraints, in order to enforce which answer sets of B ∪ H should dominate other answer sets.
Deﬁnition 6. An ordering example is a tuple o = 〈e1, e2, op〉 where e1 and e2 are partial interpretations and op is a binary 
comparison operator (<, >, =, ≤, ≥ or =). An ASP program P bravely respects o iff ∃A1, A2 ∈ AS(P ) such that all of the 
following conditions hold: (i) A1 extends e1; (ii) A2 extends e2; and (iii) 〈A1, A2, op〉 ∈ ord(P ). P cautiously respects o iff 
A1, A2 ∈ AS(P ) such that all of the following conditions hold: (i) A1 extends e1; (ii) A2 extends e2; and (iii) 〈A1, A2, op〉 /∈
ord(P ).
Note that Deﬁnition 6 generalises our initial deﬁnition of ordering examples given in [23], where ordering examples had 
only the operator <, and we could not express examples of pairs of answer sets which were equally preferred. In Section 5
we show that this extension allows us to learn a wider class of programs. We now deﬁne the notion of Learning from Ordered 
Answer Sets (I L P LO AS ).
Deﬁnition 7. A Learning from Ordered Answer Sets task is a tuple T = 〈B, SM , 〈E+, E−, Ob, Oc〉〉 where B is an ASP program, 
called the background knowledge, SM is the hypothesis space, E+ and E− are sets of partial interpretations called, respec-
tively, positive and negative examples, and Ob and Oc are sets of ordering examples over E+ called brave and cautious 
orderings. A hypothesis H ⊆ SM is an inductive solution of T (written H ∈ I L P LO AS (T )) if and only if:
1. H ∈ I L P LAS (〈B, SM , 〈E+, E−〉〉)
2. ∀o ∈ Ob B ∪ H bravely respects o
3. ∀o ∈ Oc B ∪ H cautiously respects o
Note that the orderings are only over positive examples. We chose to make this restriction as there does not appear to 
be any scenario where a hypothesis would need to respect orderings which are not extended by any pair of answer sets of 
B ∪ H .
Example 3. Consider the I L P LO AS task T = 〈B, SM , 〈E+, E−, Ob, Oc〉〉 where the individual components of the task are as 
follows:
5 It is common practice in ILP to search for the optimal (shortest) solution(s).
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• SM is unrestricted (i.e. SM is the set of all normal rules, choice rules and hard and weak constraints).
• E+ = {e+1 , e+2 } where e+1 = 〈{p}, ∅〉 and e+2 = 〈∅, {p}〉• E− = ∅
• Ob = {〈e+1 , e+2 ,<〉}
• Oc = {〈e+1 , e+1 ,=〉}
The positive examples of this task are already satisﬁed by the background knowledge, which has the answer sets ∅, {p}, 
{q} and {p,q}. As there are no negative examples, it remains to ﬁnd a set of weak constraints such that there is at least 
one answer set which contains p which is preferred to at least one answer set which does not contain p and all answer 
sets which contain p are equally optimal.
One such hypothesis is the single weak constraint :∼ not p.[1@1].
The frameworks discussed so far have examples which can only express the properties of a learned hypothesis H together 
with a ﬁxed background knowledge B . These properties are on the answer sets of B ∪ H (and the ordering of these answer 
sets). In [24], we presented a new learning framework that uses context-dependent examples. Each example comes with its 
own context, which is an ASPch program C . Examples then express properties of B ∪ H ∪C , meaning that by using multiple 
examples (with different contexts), we can express that B ∪ H ∪ C1 should have some properties and that B ∪ H ∪ C2 should 
have different properties.
Deﬁnition 8. A context-dependent partial interpretation (CDPI) is a pair 〈e, C〉, where e is a partial interpretation and C is an 
ASPch program, called a context. A context-dependent ordering example (CDOE) o is a tuple 〈〈e1, C1〉, 〈e2, C2〉, op〉, where the 
ﬁrst two elements are CDPIs and op is a binary comparison operator (<, >, =, ≤, ≥ or =). P is said to bravely respect o if 
∃A1 ∈ AS(P ∪ C1), ∃A2 ∈ AS(P ∪ C2) such that A1 extends e1, A2 extends e2 and 〈A1, A2, op〉 ∈ ord(P , AS(P ∪ C1) ∪ AS(P ∪
C2)). A program P is said to cautiously respect o if ∀A1 ∈ AS(P ∪ C1), ∀A2 ∈ AS(P ∪ C2) such that A1 extends e1 and A2
extends e2, 〈A1, A2, op〉 ∈ ord(P , AS(P ∪ C1) ∪ AS(P ∪ C2)).
When examples are given with empty contexts, they are equivalent to examples in I L P LO AS . Note also that contexts 
do not contain weak constraints. In fact, the operator P deﬁnes the ordering over two answer sets based on the weak 
constraints in one program P . So, given a CDOE 〈〈e1, C1〉, 〈e2, C2〉〉 such that C1 and C2 contain different weak constraints, 
it is not clear which program to consider for computing the ordering of answer sets – i.e. whether they should be checked 
against the weak constraints in P , P ∪ C1, P ∪ C2 or P ∪ C1 ∪ C2.
We now present a formal deﬁnition of the I L P contextLO AS framework.
Deﬁnition 9. A Context-dependent Learning from Ordered Answer Sets (I L P contextLO AS ) task is a tuple T = 〈B, SM , 〈E+, E−, Ob, Oc〉〉
where B is an ASP program called the background knowledge, SM is the set of rules allowed in the hypotheses (the 
hypothesis space), E+ and E− are ﬁnite sets of CDPIs called, respectively, positive and negative examples, and Ob and Oc
are ﬁnite sets of CDOEs over E+ called, respectively, brave and cautious context-dependent orderings. A hypothesis H ⊆ SM
is an inductive solution of T (written H ∈ I L P contextLO AS (T )) if and only if:
1. ∀〈e+, C〉 ∈ E+ , ∃A ∈ AS(B ∪ C ∪ H) st A extends e+
2. ∀〈e−, C〉 ∈ E− , A ∈ AS(B ∪ C ∪ H) st A extends e−
3. ∀o ∈ Ob , B ∪ H bravely respects o
4. ∀o ∈ Oc , B ∪ H cautiously respects o
In [24], we showed that context-dependent examples could be used to simplify the encoding of certain tasks, by splitting 
the background knowledge into contexts that were only relevant to particular examples. Although any I L P contextLO AS task can 
be transformed into an I L P LO AS task, in general this requires parts of the examples to be encoded in the background 
knowledge. Example 4 shows such a transformation.
Example 4. Consider a simple scenario where we have a machine that has a single conﬁguration parameter a, which is 
allowed to take any natural number as its value. A user is allowed to input another natural number b, and if a > b, the 
machine should beep.
Two example scenarios could be encoded as the context-dependent positive examples 〈〈{beep}, ∅〉, {value(a,3).
value(b,2).}〉, and 〈〈∅, {beep}〉, {value(a,4).value(b,20).}〉. A task containing these examples and an empty back-
ground knowledge requires an inductive solution that when combined with the context of the ﬁrst example would have 
at least one answer set containing beep, and when combined with the second example would have at least one answer 
set not containing beep. If we were expressing the same task in I L P LO AS the above two scenarios would be represented 
considering the background knowledge:
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A summary of the available systems for learning under the answer set se-
mantics.
Framework Systems
I L Pb XHAIL [42], ASPAL [38] and RASPAL [43]
I L Psm
ILPc
I L P LAS ILASP [32]
I L P LO AS ILASP [32]
I L P contextLO AS ILASP [32]
Table 2
A summary of the complexity of the various learning frameworks.
Framework Complexity of veriﬁcation Complexity of deciding satisﬁability
I L Pb N P -complete NP -complete
I L Psm NP -complete NP -complete
I L Pc D P -complete P2 -complete
I L P LAS D P -complete P2 -complete
I L P LO AS DP -complete P2 -complete
I L P contextLO AS D P -complete 
P
2 -complete
B = { 1{value(a,3),value(a,4)}1.1{value(b,2),value(b,20)}1. }
The context-dependent examples could then be mapped to the non context-dependent examples 〈{value(a,3),
value(b,2), beep}, ∅〉 and 〈{value(a,4), value(b,20)}, {beep}〉. In fact, in [24], we show that there is a general map-
ping from I L P contextLO AS to I L P LO AS . This mapping, just as the simpliﬁed mapping here, depends on encoding the examples 
in the background knowledge, which abuses the purpose of the background knowledge. The contexts in context-dependent 
examples allow us instead to separate information that is truly background knowledge, which applies in all scenarios, from 
information that is part of a particular example.
3.3. Systems for learning under the answer set semantics
The current publicly available systems for ILP can be categorised according to the 6 frameworks presented in this section 
(Table 1). It should be noted that although there are no systems which directly solve I L Pc or I L Psm tasks, both can be 
simply translated into I L P LAS tasks, and can therefore be solved by the ILASP system.
The ILED [21] system is an incremental extension of XHAIL, that is speciﬁcally targeted at learning Event Calculus [20]
theories. The underlying mechanism is based on brave induction, but each of its examples are in terms of two sequential 
time points.
4. Complexity
In this section, we discuss the complexity of each of the learning frameworks presented in Section 3 with respect to two 
decision problems: veriﬁcation, deciding whether a given hypothesis H is an inductive solution of a task T ; and satisﬁability, 
deciding whether a learning task T has any inductive solutions. A summary of the results is shown in Table 2. To aid 
readability, the proofs of the propositions stated in this section are given in appendix. All complexities discussed in this 
section are for propositional versions of the frameworks (both the background knowledge and hypothesis space of each 
learning task is ground).
4.1. Learning from answer sets with stratiﬁed summing aggregates
As there are existing results on the complexity of solving aggregate stratiﬁed programs, it is useful to introduce a new 
learning framework I L P sLAS , which is a generalization of I L P LAS , that allows summing aggregates in the bodies of rules, as 
long as they are stratiﬁed. The existing results on the complexity of these programs then allow us to prove the complexity 
of I L P sLAS . Hence, as we can show that I L P LO AS reduces to I L P
s
LAS , this is helpful in proving the complexity of I L P LO AS .
A summing aggregate s is of the form l#sum{a1 = w1, . . . ,an = wn}u, where l, u and w1, . . . , wn are integers and 
a1, . . . , an are atoms. s is satisﬁed by an interpretation I if and only if l ≤
(∑
wi∈W S wi
) ≤ u, where W S is the set {wi |
i ∈ [0..n], ai ∈ I}. We now recall the deﬁnition of aggregate stratiﬁcation from [44]. We slightly simplify the deﬁnition by 
considering only propositional programs without disjunction.
Deﬁnition 10. A propositional logic program P , in which aggregates occur only in bodies of rules, is stratiﬁed on an aggregate
agg if there is a level mapping ‖ ‖ from Atoms(P ) to ordinals, such that for each rule R ∈ P , the following holds:
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2. If agg ∈ body(R), then ∀b ∈ Atoms(agg) : ||b|| < ||head(R)||
P is said to be aggregate stratiﬁed if it is stratiﬁed on every aggregate in P .
The intuition is that aggregate stratiﬁcation forbids recursion through aggregates. In general aggregate stratiﬁed programs 
have a lower complexity than non-aggregate stratiﬁed programs. Aggregate stratiﬁcation has nothing to do with negation 
as failure, and therefore, whether a program is aggregate stratiﬁed is unrelated to whether it is stratiﬁed in the usual sense. 
Note that constraints and choice rules can be added in to any aggregate stratiﬁed program without breaking stratiﬁcation 
so long as no atoms in the head of the choice rule are on a lower level than any atom in the body. This is illustrated by the 
following example.
Example 5. Any constraint :- b1, . . . ,bn,not c1, . . . ,not cm can be rewritten as s:- b1, . . . ,bn,not c1, . . . ,not cm,
not s where s is a new atom. s can then be mapped to a higher level than any other atom.
A choice rule l{h1, . . . ,ho}u:- b1, . . . ,bn,not c1, . . . ,not cm can be rewritten as:
h1:- b1, . . . ,bn,not c1, . . . ,not cm,not h′1.
h′1:- b1, . . . ,bn,not c1, . . . ,not cm,not h1.
. . .
ho:- b1, . . . ,bn,not c1, . . . ,not cm,not h′o.
h′o:- b1, . . . ,bn,not c1, . . . ,not cm,not ho.
s:- b1, . . . ,bn,not c1, . . . ,not cm, {h1, . . . ,hn}l− 1,not s.
s′:- b1, . . . ,bn,not c1, . . . ,not cm,u+ 1{h1, . . . ,hn},not s′.
where h′1, . . . ,h′o,s,s′ are all new atoms. s and s′ can both be given a new highest level and each h′i can be given the 
same level as hi (if they did not occur in the previous program then they should be given a new level one below s and s′). 
Provided the previous program was aggregate stratiﬁed, then this new one is too. To avoid constantly using this mapping, 
we will refer to programs with choice rules and constraints as also being aggregate stratiﬁed.
Lemma 1. [44] Deciding whether an aggregate stratiﬁed propositional program without disjunction cautiously entails an atom is 
co-N P-complete.
Corollary 1. Deciding whether an aggregate stratiﬁed propositional program without disjunction bravely entails an atom is 
NP-complete.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that deciding whether an aggregate stratiﬁed propositional program without disjunction bravely en-
tails an atom is in NP . We do this by showing that there is a polynomial reduction from this problem to the complement of 
the problem in Lemma 1 (which by deﬁnition of co-NP must be in NP ). The complement of the problem in Lemma 1 is de-
ciding whether a non disjunctive aggregate stratiﬁed program does not cautiously entail an atom. Take any non-disjunctive 
aggregate stratiﬁed program P and any atom a and let neg_a be an atom that does not occur in P . P |=b a if and only if 
P ∪ {neg_a:- not a.} |=c neg_a. So the decision problem is in NP .
It remains to show that deciding whether an aggregate stratiﬁed propositional program without disjunction bravely 
entails an atom is NP -hard. We do this by showing that any problem in NP can be reduced in polynomial time to deciding 
the satisﬁability of an aggregate stratiﬁed propositional program without disjunction.
Consider an arbitrary NP problem D . The complement of D , D¯ , must be in co-NP (by deﬁnition of co-NP ). Hence, by 
Lemma 1, there is a polynomial reduction from D¯ to deciding whether an aggregate stratiﬁed propositional program without 
disjunction cautiously entails an atom. We deﬁne the polynomial reduction from D to deciding whether an aggregate 
stratiﬁed propositional program without disjunction bravely entails an atom as follows: for any instance I of D , let P and 
a be the program and atom given by the polynomial reduction from the complement of I to deciding cautious entailment; 
deﬁne P ′ as the program P ∪ {neg_a:- not a.} (where neg_a is a new atom). I returns true if and only if P |=c a if and 
only if P ′ |=b neg_a. Hence, as P ′ is still aggregate stratiﬁed (the new atom neg_a can be put in the top strata), this is a 
polynomial reduction from D to deciding whether an aggregate stratiﬁed propositional program without disjunction bravely 
entails an atom. Hence, the decision problem is NP -hard. 
We can now introduce our extra learning task, Learning from Answer Sets with Stratiﬁed Aggregates (I L P sLAS ). It is the same 
as Learning from Answer Sets, except for allowing summing aggregates in the bodies of the rules in B and SM , as long as 
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B ∪ SM is aggregate stratiﬁed. Note that the condition of B ∪ SM being aggregate stratiﬁed implies that for any hypothesis 
H ⊆ SM , B ∪ H is aggregate stratiﬁed.
4.2. Relationships between the learning tasks
In this section we prove for both decision problems that I L Pb and I L Psm both reduce to each other polynomially. We 
also show that for both decision problems there is a chain of polynomial reductions from I L Pc to I L P LAS to I L P contextLO AS to 
I L P LO AS to I L P sLAS . This chain of reductions is then used in proving that all four tasks share the same complexity for both 
decision problems. By proving that I L Pc is O-hard and I L P sLAS is in O for some complexity class O, we prove that all four 
tasks are O-complete. Similarly as I L Pb and I L Psm both reduce polynomially to each other for both decision problems, if 
for one of the problems I L Pb is O-complete for some class then so is I L Psm . The chains of reductions are shown in Fig. 1.
Proposition 1 shows that the complexity of I L Pb and I L Psm coincide for both decision problems.
Proposition 1.
1. Deciding both veriﬁcation and satisﬁability for I L Pb reduces polynomially to the corresponding I L Psm decision problem.
2. Deciding both veriﬁcation and satisﬁability for I L Psm reduces polynomially to the corresponding I L Pb decision problem.
Proposition 2 shows that there is a chain of polynomial reductions from I L Pc to I L P LAS to I L P LO AS to I L P contextLO AS to 
I L P sLAS for both decision problems.
Proposition 2.
1. Deciding both veriﬁcation and satisﬁability for I L Pc reduces polynomially to the corresponding I L P LAS decision problem.
2. Deciding both veriﬁcation and satisﬁability for I L P LAS reduces polynomially to the corresponding I L P contextLO AS decision problem.
3. Deciding both veriﬁcation and satisﬁability for I L P contextLO AS reduces polynomially to the corresponding I L P LO AS decision problem.
4. Deciding both veriﬁcation and satisﬁability for I L P LO AS reduces polynomially to the corresponding I L P sLAS decision problem.
4.3. Complexity of deciding veriﬁcation and satisﬁability for each framework
For each of the learning frameworks, we prove the complexity of deciding veriﬁcation and satisﬁability. We start with 
the I L Pb and I L Psm frameworks, for which both decision problems are NP -complete.
Proposition 3. Verifying whether a given H is an inductive solution of a general I L Pb task is NP-complete.
Corollary 2. Verifying whether a given H is an inductive solution of a general I L Psm task is NP-complete.
Proposition 4. Deciding the satisﬁability of a general I L Pb task is NP-complete.
Corollary 3. Deciding the satisﬁability of a general I L Psm task is NP-complete.
We have now proven the complexity of deciding veriﬁcation and satisﬁability for I L Pb and I L Psm , proving the corre-
sponding entries in Table 2. It remains to show the complexities for I L Pc , I L P LAS , I L P LO AS and I L P contextLO AS .
As we have shown that I L Pc reduces to I L P LAS which, in turn, reduces to I L P LO AS , which reduces to I L P contextLO AS and that 
I L P contextLO AS reduces to I L P
s
LAS (all in polynomial time), to prove the complexity of verifying a hypothesis for each framework, 
it suﬃces to show that I L Pc is DP -hard (thus also proving the hardness for each of the other frameworks) and that I L P sLAS
is a member of DP (thus proving membership for the other frameworks). This shows that each framework is both a member 
of DP and also DP -hard, and therefore must be DP -complete.
Proposition 5. Deciding veriﬁcation for I L P s is a member of DP .LAS
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We can now prove the complexity of deciding veriﬁcation for I L Pc , I L P LAS and I L P LO AS . This proves the corresponding 
entries in Table 2.
Theorem 2. Deciding whether a given H is a solution of any I L Pc , I L P LAS , I L P LO AS or I L P contextLO AS task is DP-complete in each case.
Proof. By Proposition 6, deciding the veriﬁcation for I L Pc is DP -hard. By Proposition 2, deciding the veriﬁcation for I L Pc
reduces to deciding veriﬁcation for I L P LAS which, in turn, reduces to deciding veriﬁcation for I L P contextLO AS , which reduces to 
deciding satisﬁability for I L P LO AS , which again reduces to deciding veriﬁcation for I L P sLAS and by Proposition 5, deciding 
veriﬁcation for I L P sLAS is a member of DP . Deciding veriﬁcation for each of these learning frameworks must therefore be 
both a member of DP and must be DP -hard. Hence, deciding veriﬁcation for each framework is DP -complete. 
Similarly, to show that deciding satisﬁability is P2 -complete for each framework, we only need to show that I L P
s
LAS is 
a member of P2 and I L Pc is 
P
2 -hard.
Proposition 7. Deciding satisﬁability for I L P sLAS is in 
P
2 .
Proposition 8. Deciding satisﬁability for I L Pc is P2 -hard.
We can now prove the complexity of deciding satisﬁability for I L Pc , I L P LAS and I L P LO AS . This proves the remaining 
entries in Table 2.
Theorem 3. Deciding the satisﬁability of any I L Pc, I L P LAS , I L P LO AS or I L P contextLO AS task is 
P
2 -complete in each case.
Proof. (similar to the proof of Theorem 2) By Proposition 8, deciding satisﬁability for I L Pc is P2 -hard. By Proposition 2, 
deciding satisﬁability for I L Pc reduces to deciding satisﬁability for I L P LAS which, in turn, reduces to deciding satisﬁability 
for I L P contextLO AS , which reduces to deciding satisﬁability for I L P LO AS , which again reduces to deciding satisﬁability of I L P
s
LAS . 
By Proposition 7, deciding satisﬁability for I L P sLAS is in 
P
2 . Deciding satisﬁability for each of these learning frameworks is 
therefore both a member of P2 and is 
P
2 -hard. Hence, deciding satisﬁability for each framework is 
P
2 -complete. 
4.4. Considering noisy examples
Although the frameworks considered in this paper were originally presented under the assumption that all examples 
were perfectly labeled (i.e. there is no noise in the examples), some of the systems for solving these tasks do consider noise 
when searching for an optimal solution.
A common approach, used by both XHAIL [42] and ILASP [32] is to penalise hypotheses for the examples they do not 
cover. In ILASP, some examples can be labeled together with a penalty that must be paid if a hypothesis does not cover 
the example. Any example that is not labeled with a penalty must be covered by any inductive solution. Given a set of 
examples E , the score of a hypothesis H is said to be |H | + p(H, E), where |H | is the length of the hypothesis, and p(H, E)
is the sum of the weights of all examples that are not covered by H . As a hypothesis is an inductive solution if and only if 
it covers all the examples that are labeled with a penalty, that were not labeled with an explicit penalty, the two decision 
problems of veriﬁcation and satisﬁability can be reduced to the corresponding decisions for non-noisy tasks (by simply 
removing any example with a penalty).
5. Generality
In this section, we present a new notion of the generality of a learning framework. The aim is to get a sense of which 
class of ASP programs a framework is capable of learning, if given suﬃcient examples. Language biases tend, in general, to 
impose their own restrictions on the classes of program that can be learned. They are primarily used to aid the performance 
of the computation, rather than to capture intrinsic properties of a learning framework. In this section we will therefore 
consider learning tasks with unrestricted hypothesis spaces: hypotheses can be constructed from any set of (ﬁrst order) 
normal rules, choice rules and hard and weak constraints. We assume each learning framework F to have a task consisting 
of a pair 〈B, EF 〉, where B is the (ﬁrst order ASP) background knowledge and EF is a tuple consisting of the examples for 
this framework; for example ELAS = 〈E+, E−〉 where E+ and E− are sets of partial interpretations.
Allowing an unrestricted hypothesis space raises the question of whether a learning framework is general enough to 
deﬁne tasks that lead to a particular set of hypotheses as the inductive solutions. On a ﬁrst instance, we could say that a 
framework F is general enough to learn a hypothesis H if there is at least one task TF in this framework such that H is 
an inductive solution of TF . However, as shown in Example 6, such a “loose notion” of generality may lead to the trivial 
learning framework, whose learning tasks have no examples, as the most general framework possible.
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tuple and B is an ASP program. I L P(〈B, E〉) is then the set of all ASP programs, i.e., every ASP program is a solution of 
every I L P task. Although for every hypothesis H , given any background knowledge B there is clearly a set of examples 
E such that H ∈ I L P(〈B, E〉), every other possible hypothesis is also a solution of this same task, making it impossible 
to distinguish any hypothesis from another.
It is clearly not suﬃcient to say that a framework is general enough to learn some target hypothesis (denoted from now 
on as HT ) if we can ﬁnd at least one learning task with HT as a solution. What this deﬁnition lacks is a way to express that 
HT is a solution of a task T , but that some other (unwanted) hypothesis is not a solution of T . To capture this property of a 
learning framework we should be able to say that a task T can distinguish a hypothesis HT from the unwanted hypothesis. 
Pairs of target and unwanted hypotheses, which can be distinguished from each other, are an interesting starting point when 
considering generality of a learning framework. But this again might not be the only property of generality. Frameworks, 
such as brave induction, can distinguish the target hypothesis HT from two (or more) unwanted hypotheses, e.g., H ′1 and H ′2, 
in two separate learning tasks, but they may not have a single learning task capable of accepting HT as inductive solution 
but neither H ′1 nor H ′2. Consider for instance the following example.
Example 7. Imagine the scenario where we are observing a coin being tossed several times. Obviously there are two out-
comes, and we would like to learn an ASP program whose answer sets correspond to these two different outcomes. Consider 
the background knowledge B to be empty, and the atoms heads and tails to be true when the coin lands on heads 
or tails respectively. Our target hypothesis HT is an ASP program such that AS(B ∪ H) = {{heads}, {tails}}. One such 
hypothesis could be the program HT = {1{heads,tails}1.}. Consider now the two hypotheses H ′1 = {heads.} and 
H ′2 = {tails.}, which correspond to the coin always landing on heads or tails respectively. Neither of these hypothe-
sis correctly represent the behaviour of the coin, so they are unwanted hypotheses. There is one answer set, {heads}, of 
B ∪ H ′1 and one answer set, {tails}, of B ∪ H ′2. I L Pb can distinguish HT from H ′1 and from H ′2 separately with the tasks 〈B, 〈{tails}, ∅〉〉 and 〈B, 〈{heads}, ∅〉〉, respectively. But there is, however, no learning task for I L Pb for which HT is an 
inductive solution and neither H ′1 nor H ′2 is.
A more general notion of generality of learning framework can be considered, which looks at distinguishing a target hy-
pothesis HT from a set of unwanted hypotheses S . In Section 5.2 we introduce the notion of one-to-many-distinguishability 
class of a learning framework. This corresponds to the class of pairs of single hypothesis HT ’s and set S ’s of hypotheses for 
which a learning framework has at least one task that distinguishes HT from each hypothesis in S . Informally, this notion 
expresses the generality of a framework in ﬁnding a single target hypothesis in the presence of many unwanted hypotheses. 
In Section 5.3, we extend one-to-many-distinguishability class of a learning framework to many-to-many-distinguishability, 
which in turns captures the notion of distinguishing a set of target hypotheses S1 from another set of unwanted hypothe-
ses S2, with a single task.
In the remainder of this section we explore these three new measures of generality, expressed as three different learning 
problems. One-to-one-distinguishability determines the hypotheses that a framework is general enough to learn, while 
ruling out another unwanted hypothesis; one-to-many-distinguishability determines the hypotheses that can be learned 
from within a space of unwanted hypotheses; and ﬁnally, many-to-many-distinguishability determines exactly which sets 
of hypotheses can be learned. We will prove properties of our three classes of generalities making use of a deﬁnition of 
strong reduction from one framework to another. Strong reduction is different from the concept of reduction presented in 
[45]. Deﬁnitions 11 and 12 present, respectively, a reformulation of the notion of reduction introduced in [45] and of our 
new concept of strong reduction.
Deﬁnition 11. A framework F1 reduces to F2 (written F1 →r F2) if for every F1 task TF1 there is an F2 task TF2 such 
that I L PF1 (TF1 ) = I L PF2 (TF2 ). A framework F1 is at least as r-general as F2 if F2 →r F1; and F1 is more r-general than F2
if F2 →r F1 and F1r F2.
Example 8. Consider the I L Pb and I L Pc learning frameworks. I L Pb →r I L Pc , as any I L Pb task 〈B, 〈E+, E−〉〉 maps to the 
I L Pc task 〈B ∪ {:- not e. | e ∈ E+} ∪ {:- e. | e ∈ E−}, 〈∅, ∅〉〉. I L Pc does not, however, reduce to I L Pb . Consider, for 
instance, the I L Pc task Tc = 〈∅, 〈{p}, ∅〉〉 and assume that there is a task Tb = 〈B, 〈E+, E−〉〉 such that I L Pb(Tb) = I L Pc(Tc). 
The hypothesis H1 = {p.} ∈ I L Pc(Tc), and, given the assumption, H1 is also in I L Pb(Tb). But consider now the hypothesis 
H2 = {0{p}1.}. Since AS(B ∪ H1) ⊆ AS(B ∪ H2), if B ∪ H1 has an answer set extending 〈E+, E−〉, then so does B ∪ H2. Thus, 
if H1 ∈ I L Pb(Tb) then H2 ∈ I L Pb(Tb). But, although H2 ∈ I L Pb(Tb), it is easy to see that H2 /∈ I L Pc(Tc), so making I L Pb(Tb)
not equal to I L Pc(Tc). Hence, I L Pc does not reduce to I L Pb , and I L Pc is more r-general than I L Pb .
We discuss the relationship between reductions and our own measures of generality in Section 6. Our notion of strong 
reduction differs from the above notion of reduction, in the fact that the reduced task must have the same background 
knowledge as the original task.
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F2 = 〈B, EF2 〉 task TF2 such that I L PF1 (TF1 ) = I L PF2 (TF2 ). A framework F1 is at least as sr-general as F2 if F2 →sr F1; 
and F1 is more sr-general than F2 if F2 →sr F1 and F1sr F2.
Proposition 9 shows the strong reduction relations between the frameworks considered in this paper. Note that although 
I L Pc is more r-general than I L Pb (as shown in Example 8), it is not more sr-general than I L Pb . This is because without 
changing the background knowledge, I L Pc cannot represent the same I L Pb tasks.
Proposition 9.
1. I L Pb →sr I L Psm →sr I L P LAS →sr I L P LO AS →sr I L P contextLO AS
2. I L Pc →sr I L P LAS
Proof.
1. For any I L Pb task Tb = 〈B, 〈E+, E−〉〉, I L Pb(Tb) = I L Psm(〈B, 〈{〈E+, E−〉}〉〉)
For any I L Psm task Tsm = 〈B, 〈{e1, . . . , en}〉〉, I L Psm(Tsm) = I L P LAS(〈B, 〈{e1, . . . , en}, ∅〉〉)
For any I L P LAS task TLAS = 〈B, 〈E+, E−〉〉, I L P LAS (TLAS ) = I L P LO AS (〈B, 〈E+, E−, ∅, ∅〉〉)
For any partial interpretation e, let c(e) be the CDPI 〈e, ∅〉. For any I L P LO AS task TLO AS = 〈B, 〈E+, E−, Ob, Oc〉〉, 
I L P LO AS (TLO AS) = I L P contextLO AS (〈B, 〈{c(e) | e ∈ E+}, {c(e) | e ∈ E−}, {〈c(e1), c(e2)〉 | 〈e1, e2〉 ∈ Ob}, {〈c(e1), c(e2)〉 | 〈e1, e2〉 ∈
Oc}〉〉)
2. For any I L Pc task Tc = 〈B, 〈{e+1 , . . . , e+m}, {e−1 , . . . , e−n }〉〉, I L Pc(Tc) = I L P LAS (〈B, 〈{〈∅, ∅〉}, {〈∅, {e+1 }〉, . . . , 〈∅, {e+m}〉, 〈{e−1 },∅〉, . . . , 〈{e−n },∅〉}〉〉). Note that the empty I L P LAS positive example enforces that there is at least one answer set, and 
both the I L Pc positive and negative examples are mapped to I L P LAS negative examples which enforce in the case of 
positive (resp. negative) examples that they are not false (resp. not true) in any answer set, and hence true (resp. false) 
in every answer set. 
5.1. Distinguishability
A one-to-one-distinguishability class captures those pairs of hypotheses H1 and H2 that can be distinguished from each 
other with respect to a given possible background knowledge.
Deﬁnition 13. The one-to-one-distinguishability class of a learning framework F (denoted D11(F)) is the set of tuples 〈B, H1, H2〉 of ASP programs for which there is at least one task TF = 〈B, EF 〉 such that H1 ∈F(TF ) and H2 /∈F(TF ). For 
each 〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈D11(F), TF is said to distinguish H1 from H2 with respect to B . Given two frameworks F1 and F2, we 
say that F1 is at least as (resp. more) D11-general as (resp. than) F2 if D11(F2) ⊆D11(F1) (resp. D11(F2) ⊂D11(F1)).
Note that the one-to-one-distinguishability relationship is not symmetric; i.e. there are pairs of hypotheses H1 and H2
such that, given a background knowledge B , H1 can be distinguished from H2, but H2 can not be distinguished from H1. 
This is illustrated by Example 9.
Example 9. Consider a background knowledge B that deﬁnes the concepts of cell, same_block, same_row and same_column 
for a 4x4 Sudoku grid.
Let H1 be the incomplete description of the Sudoku rules:
1 { value(C, 1), value(C, 2), value(C, 3), value(C, 4) } 1 :- cell(C).
:- value(C1, V), value(C2, V), same_row(C1, C2).
:- value(C1, V), value(C2, V), same_col(C1, C2).
Also let H2 be the complete description of the Sudoku rules:
1 { value(C, 1), value(C, 2), value(C, 3), value(C, 4) } 1 :- cell(C).
:- value(C1, V), value(C2, V), same_row(C1, C2).
:- value(C1, V), value(C2, V), same_col(C1, C2).
:- value(C1, V), value(C2, V), same_block(C1, C2).
I L Pb can distinguish H1 from H2 with respect to B . This can be seen using the task 〈B, 〈{value((1,1),1),
value((2,2),1)}, ∅〉〉. On the other hand, I L Pb cannot distinguish H2 from H1. Whatever examples are given in a learning 
task to learn H2, it must be the case that E+ ⊆ A and E− ∩ A = ∅, where A is an answer set of B ∪ H2. But answer sets 
of B ∪ H2 are also answer sets of B ∪ H1. So A is also an answer set of B ∪ H1, which implies that H1 satisﬁes the same 
examples and is a solution of the same learning task.
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A summary of the suﬃcient and necessary conditions in each learning framework for a hypothesis H1 to be 
distinguishable from another hypothesis H2 with respect to a background knowledge B .
Framework F Suﬃcient/necessary condition for 〈B, H1, H2〉 to be in D11(F)
I L P ⊥
I L Pb AS(B ∪ H1) AS(B ∪ H2)
I L Psm AS(B ∪ H1) AS(B ∪ H2)
I L Pc AS(B ∪ H1) = ∅ ∧ (AS(B ∪ H2) = ∅∨ (Ec(B ∪ H1) Ec(B ∪ H2)))
I L P LAS AS(B ∪ H1) = AS(B ∪ H2)
I L P LO AS (AS(B ∪ H1) = AS(B ∪ H2)) ∨ (ord(B ∪ H1) = ord(B ∪ H2))
I L P contextLO AS (B ∪ H1 ≡s B ∪ H2) ∨ (∃C ∈ASPch st ord(B ∪ H1 ∪ C) = ord(B ∪ H2 ∪ C))
In fact, Proposition 10 generalises Example 9 showing that I L Pb cannot distinguish any program containing a constraint 
from the same program without the constraint.
Proposition 10. I L Pb cannot distinguish any hypothesis H which contains a constraint C from H\{C}, with respect to any background 
knowledge.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that there is a hypothesis H = H ′ ∪ C where C is a constraint and an I L Pb task Tb =
〈B, 〈E+, E−〉〉 such that H ∈ I L Pb(Tb) and H ′ /∈ I L Pb(Tb).
⇒ ∃A ∈ AS(B ∪ H) such that E+ ⊆ A and E− ∩ A = ∅. But as C is a constraint AS(B ∪ H) ⊆ AS(B ∪ H ′) and so A ∈
AS(B ∪ H ′).
⇒ ∃A ∈ AS(B ∪ H ′) such that E+ ⊆ A and E− ∩ A = ∅.
⇒ H ′ ∈ I L Pb(Tb). Contradiction! 
One useful property is that if there is a strong reduction from one framework F1 to another framework F2 then 
D11(F1) ⊆ D11(F2). Note that F2 is not guaranteed to be more D11-general than F1, even in the case when there is no 
reduction from F2 to F1.
Proposition 11. For any two frameworks F1 and F2: F1 →sr F2 ⇒D11(F1) ⊆D11(F2).
Proof. Assume that F1 →sr F2. Take any 〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈D11(F1). There must be some task TF1 , with background knowledge 
B , such that H1 ∈ I L PF1 (TF1 ) and H2 /∈ I L PF1 (TF1 ). Hence, as F1 →sr F2, there must be some task TF2 , with background 
knowledge B , such that H1 ∈ I L PF2 (TF2 ) and H2 /∈ I L PF2 (TF2 ). So 〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈D11(F2). Hence, D11(F1) ⊆D11(F2). 
As there are clear strong reductions (shown by Proposition 9), an ordering of the one-to-one-distinguishability classes of 
the frameworks emerges (shown in Corollary 4).
Corollary 4.
1. D11(I L Pb) ⊆D11(I L Psm) ⊆D11(I L P LAS) ⊆D11(I L P LO AS ) ⊆D11(I L P contextLO AS )
2. D11(I L Pc) ⊆D11(I L P LAS)
While this does give us information about the ordering of the power of the frameworks to distinguish between hy-
potheses, it does not tell us, for example, what the relationship is between the distinguishability classes of I L Pb and 
I L Pc . It does not tell us which of the ⊆’s are strict (in fact, D11(I L Pb) = D11(I L Psm), but the rest are strict subset re-
lations). For each framework, Table 3 shows the necessary and suﬃcient condition needed to be able to distinguish 
hypotheses. In the case of the cautious induction framework, the condition makes use of a new notation. Given a program 
P , Eb(P ) = {i1 ∧ . . . ∧ im ∧ not e1 ∧ . . . ∧ not en|∃A ∈ AS(P ) st i1, . . . ,im ∈ A and e1, . . . ,en /∈ A}, i.e. Eb(P ) denotes the 
set of conjunctions of literals that are true in at least one answer set of P . Similarly, we use Ec(P ) to denote the set of 
conjunctions of literals that are true in every answer set of P . The following property holds.
Proposition 12. For any programs P1 and P2 , Eb(P1) ⊆ Eb(P2) if and only if AS(P1) ⊆ AS(P2).
Propositions 13 to 18 prove the one-to-one-distinguishability classes of I L Pb , I L Psm , I L Pc , I L P LAS , I L P LO AS and 
I L P contextLO AS , showing also the suﬃcient and necessary conditions for distinguishability presented in Table 3. To aid readability, 
the proofs are in the appendix rather than the main paper.
Proposition 13. D1(I L Pb) =
{〈B, H1, H2〉∣∣ AS(B ∪ H1) AS(B ∪ H2)}.1
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that if I L Psm can distinguish one hypothesis H1 from another hypothesis H2 then, there must be some task Tsm such that 
H1 is a solution of Tsm and H2 is not. This means that H1 must cover all of the examples of Tsm and there must be at least 
one (partial interpretation) example of Tsm which is not covered by H2. This partial interpretation example can be given as 
the set of positive and negative examples in an I L Pb task. This I L Pb task will then distinguish H1 from H2.
Proposition 14. D11(I L Pb) =D11(I L Psm).
To better compare the conditions for I L Pb and I L Pc , we can express the necessary and suﬃcient condition of I L Pb in 
terms of the notion Eb(P ). Speciﬁcally, in I L Pb for one hypothesis H1 to be distinguishable from another hypothesis H2
(with respect to a background knowledge B) it is both necessary and suﬃcient for Eb(B ∪ H1) to contain at least one 
conjunction that is not in Eb(B ∪ H2). This is because the extra conjunction can be used to generate a set of examples that 
are covered by H1 but not H2. This is demonstrated by Example 10.
Example 10. Consider again the programs B = ∅, H1 = {1{heads,tails}1.} and H2 = {heads.}. Eb(B ∪ H1) contains the 
conjunction not heads∧tails, whereas Eb(B ∪ H2) does not. This conjunction can be mapped into the positive example 
tails and the negative example heads, which B ∪ H1 covers, but B ∪ H2 does not – i.e. the task 〈B, 〈{tails}, {heads}〉〉
distinguishes H1 from H2.
So, as the one-to-one-distinguishability condition for I L Pb could also be expressed as Eb(B ∪ H1)  Eb(B ∪ H2), it might 
be expected that the one-to-one-distinguishability condition for I L Pc would be that Ec(B ∪ H1)  Ec(B ∪ H2). Indeed this 
would be the case, if it were not for the extra condition that I L Pc imposes on any inductive solution: that is, any inductive 
solution H must be such that B ∪ H is satisﬁable. Although this extra condition may seem unnecessary at ﬁrst sight, 
its importance becomes clear when considering distinguishability. Without this extra condition, no hypothesis would be 
distinguishable from the hypothesis given by the empty constraint “:- .” – i.e. there would be no hypothesis H such that 
〈B, H, {:- .}〉 ∈D11(I L Pc) (for any B). This is because there cannot be any answer set of B ∪ {:- .} that does not cover the 
examples (as there are no answer sets). As I L Pc has the extra condition that B ∪ H must be satisﬁable, its distinguishability 
condition is slightly more complicated than Ec(B ∪ H1)  Ec(B ∪ H2), as shown in Proposition 15.
Proposition 15. D11(I L Pc) =
{
〈B, H1, H2〉
∣∣∣∣ AS(B ∪ H1) = ∅∧(AS(B ∪ H2) = ∅∨ Ec(B ∪ H2) Ec(B ∪ H1))
}
.
We now prove the one-to-one-distinguishability classes of our own frameworks, I L P LAS and I L P LO AS . D11(I L P LAS) con-
tains both D11(I L Pb) and D11(I L Pc) as I L P LAS can distinguish any two hypotheses which, combined with the background 
knowledge, have different answer sets.
Proposition 16. D11(I L P LAS ) = {〈B, H1, H2〉|AS(B ∪ H1) = AS(B ∪ H2)} .
As shown in Theorem 4, I L P LO AS is more D11-general than I L P LAS . This is because I L P LO AS is able to use its ordering 
examples to distinguish any two hypotheses that, when combined with the background knowledge, order their answer sets 
differently, even if the two programs have the same answer sets.
Proposition 17. D11(I L P LO AS) =
{
〈B, H1, H2〉
∣∣∣∣ AS(B ∪ H1) = AS(B ∪ H2) orord(B ∪ H1) = ord(B ∪ H2)
}
.
Note that we assume I L P LO AS to be able to give ordering examples with any of the binary ordering operators. The 
slightly more restrictive version of I L P LO AS , presented in [23] where the operator is only the <, has a smaller one-to-one-
distinguishability class. This is shown in Example 11.
Example 11. Consider the heads and tails problem again, where B = { 1{heads, tails}1. }, and two potential hypotheses:
• H1 = ∅
• H2 = {:∼ heads.[1@1]}
AS(B ∪ H1) = AS(B ∪ H2) = {{heads}, {tails}}. If we consider the restricted I L P LO AS where only the operator < is 
used to express ordering over the examples, H2 can be distinguished from H1, but not H1 from H2. This is because all 
answer sets of B ∪ H1 are equally optimal – neither 〈{tails}, {heads}, <〉 nor 〈{heads}, {tails}, <〉 is in ord(B ∪ H1). 
In contrast, if we allow the use of any of the binary ordering operators, we can consider a task with the ordering example 
〈{tails}, {heads}, =〉 and be able to distinguish H1 from H2. The learned hypothesis H1 has no weak constraints, so 
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{heads}.
I L P LO AS can distinguish any two hypotheses that, when combined with a ﬁxed background knowledge, behave dif-
ferently. It cannot distinguish hypotheses that are different but behave the same with respect to the background knowl-
edge. This means that there are some hypotheses that are not strongly equivalent (when combined with the background 
knowledge), but I L P LO AS cannot distinguish one from the other. We now show that I L P contextLO AS can distinguish between 
any two hypotheses, H1 and H2, that, when combined with the background knowledge, are not strongly equivalent, 
or there is at least one program C ∈ ASPch (consisting of normal rules, choice rules and hard constraints), such that 
ord(B ∪ H1 ∪ C) = ord(B, ∪H2 ∪ C).
Proposition 18.
D11(I L P contextLO AS ) =
{
〈B, H1, H2〉
∣∣∣∣ B ∪ H1 ≡
s B ∪ H2 or
∃C ∈ASPch such that ord(B ∪ H1 ∪ C) = ord(B ∪ H2 ∪ C)
}
Now that we have proven the distinguishability classes for each learning framework, we can strengthen the statement of 
Corollary 4 and more precisely state the relationship between the distinguishability classes of the frameworks. Apart from 
the case of I L Pb and I L Psm , each of the subset relations in Corollary 4 are in fact strict subsets.
Theorem 4. Consider the learning frameworks I L Pb, I L Pc , I L Psm, I L P LAS , I L P LO AS and I L P contextLO AS .
1. D11(I L Pb) =D11(I L Psm) ⊂D11(I L P LAS) ⊂D11(I L P LO AS ) ⊂D11(I L P contextLO AS )
2. D11(I L Pc) ⊂D11(I L P LAS)
Proof.
1. The fact that D11(I L Pb) = D11(I L Psm) was shown in Proposition 14. By Corollary 4, D11(I L Psm) ⊆ D11(I L P LAS ) ⊆
D11(I L P LO AS ) ⊆ D11(I L P contextLO AS ); hence, it remains to show that D11(I L Psm) = D11(I L P LAS ) = D11(I L P LO AS ) =
D11(I L P contextLO AS )• Consider the tuple 〈B, H1, H2〉, where B = ∅, H1 = {p.} and H2 = {1{p,q}1}. AS(B ∪ H1) ⊂ AS(B ∪ H2), hence 
〈B, H1, H2〉 does not satisfy the condition, given in Table 3, necessary for it to be in D11(I L Psm). It does, however, 
satisfy the condition for it to be in D11(I L P LAS). Hence, D11(I L Psm) =D11(I L P LAS).• Consider the tuple 〈B, H1, H2〉, where B = {1{p,q}1}, H1 = ∅ and H2 = {:∼ p.[1@1]}. AS(B ∪ H1) = AS(B ∪ H2)
and ord(B ∪ H1) = ord(B ∪ H2). Hence, by the conditions in Table 3, 〈B, H1, H2〉 is in D11(I L P LO AS ) but is not in 
D11(I L P LAS ). Therefore, D11(I L P LAS ) =D11(I L P LO AS ).• Consider the tuple 〈B, H1, H2〉, where B = ∅, H1 = ∅ and H2 = {p:-q.}. Also consider the program P = {q.}. AS(B ∪
H1) = AS(B ∪ H2) and ord(B ∪ H1) = ord(B ∪ H2), but AS(B ∪ H1 ∪ P ) = AS(B ∪ H2 ∪ P ); this shows that B ∪ H1 ≡s
B ∪ H2. Hence, by the conditions in Table 3, 〈B, H1, H2〉 is in D11(I L P contextLO AS ) but is not in D11(I L P LO AS ). Therefore, 
D11(I L P LO AS ) =D11(I L P contextLO AS ).
2. By Corollary 4, D11(I L Pc) ⊆ D11(I L P LAS ). Hence, it remains to show that D11(I L Pc) = D11(I L P LAS ). Consider the tuple 〈B, H1, H2〉, where B = {p:- not p}, H1 = ∅ and H2 = {p.}. AS(B ∪ H1) = ∅ and AS(B ∪ H1) = AS(B ∪ H2). By the 
conditions in Table 3, 〈B, H1, H2〉 is in D11(I L P LAS ) but is not in D11(I L Pc). Hence, D11(I L Pc) =D11(I L P LAS ). 
5.2. The one-to-many-distinguishability class of a learning framework
In practice an ILP task has a search space of possible hypotheses, and it is important to know the cases in which one 
particular hypothesis can be distinguished from the rest. In what follows, we analyse the conditions under which a learning 
framework can distinguish an hypothesis from a set of other hypotheses. As mentioned at the beginning of Section 5, 
this corresponds to the new notion we call the one-to-many-distinguishability class of a learning framework, which is a 
generalisation of the notion of the one-to-one-distinguishability class described above.
Deﬁnition 14. The one-to-many-distinguishability class of a learning framework F (denoted D1m(F)) is the set of all tu-
ples 〈B, H, {H1, . . . , Hn}〉 such that there is a task TF which distinguishes H from each Hi with respect to B . Given 
two frameworks F1 and F2, we say that F1 is at least as (resp. more) D1m-general than F2 if D1m(F2) ⊆ D1m(F1) (resp. 
D1m(F2) ⊂D1m(F1)).
The one-to-many-distinguishability class tells us the circumstances in which a framework is general enough to 
distinguish some target hypothesis from a set of unwanted hypotheses. Note that, although the tuples in a one-to-
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distinguishability class of that framework, it is not always the case that if F1 is more D1m-general than F2 then F1 is 
also more D11-general than F2. For example, we will see that I L Psm is more D1m-general than I L Pb , but we have already 
shown in Proposition 14 that the I L Pb and I L Psm are equally D11-general. Proposition 19 shows, however, that if F1 is at 
least as D1m-general as F2 then F1 is at least as D11-general as F2.
Proposition 19. For any two frameworks F1 and F2 such that F1 is at least as D1m-general as F2 , F1 is at least as D11-general as F2
(i.e. D1m(F2) ⊆D1m(F1) ⇒D11(F2) ⊆D11(F1)).
Proof. Assume that F1 is at least as D1m-general as F2 and let 〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈ D11(F2). To show that F1 is at least as 
D11-general as F2, we must show that 〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈D11(F1).
As 〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈D11(F2), 〈B, H1, {H2}〉 ∈D1m(F2); hence, as F1 is at least as D1m-general as F2, 〈B, H1, {H2}〉 ∈D1m(F1); 
and hence, 〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈D11(F1). 
We have already seen that if there is a strong reduction from F1 to F2 then F2 is at least as D11-general as F1. 
Proposition 20 shows that a similar result holds for D1m-generality. Similarly to D11-generality, however, a strong reduction 
from F1 to F2 does not imply that F2 is more D1m-general than F1, even in the case that there is no strong reduction from 
F2 to F1.
Proposition 20. For any two frameworks F1 and F2: F1 →sr F2 ⇒D1m(F1) ⊆D1m(F2).
Proof. Assume that F1 →sr F2. Take any 〈B, H, S〉 ∈D1m(F1). There must be some task TF1 , with background knowledge B , 
such that H ∈ I L PF1 (TF1 ) and S∩ I L PF1 (TF1 ) = ∅. Hence, as F1 →sr F2, there must be some F2 task TF2 , with background 
knowledge B , such that H ∈ I L PF2 (TF2 ) and S ∩ I L PF2 (TF2 ) = ∅. So 〈B, H, S〉 ∈D1m(F2). Hence, D1m(F1) ⊆D1m(F2). 
Due to the strong reductions shown in Proposition 9, an ordering of the one-to-many-distinguishability classes of the 
frameworks emerges (shown in Corollary 5).
Corollary 5.
1. D1m(I L Pb) ⊆D1m(I L Psm) ⊆D1m(I L P LAS) ⊆D1m(I L P LO AS ) ⊆D1m(I L P contextLO AS )
2. D1m(I L Pc) ⊆D1m(I L P LAS )
This time, we will see that each of the ⊆’s in Corollary 5 can be upgraded to a strict ⊂. Rather than proving the 
one-to-many-distinguishability classes from scratch, we now present a useful result. For some frameworks, the one-to-one-
distinguishability class of a learning framework can be used to construct the one-to-many-distinguishability class. This is 
the case when the framework has closed one-to-many-distinguishability (formalised by Deﬁnition 15). Proposition 21 and 
Corollary 6 show how the one-to-many-distinguishability class of a framework can be constructed using its one-to-one-
distinguishability class if it has closed one-to-many-distinguishability.
Deﬁnition 15. Given any learning framework F , the closure of the one-to-many-distinguishability class, written D1m(F), is 
the set {〈B, H, S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sn〉 | 〈B, H, S1〉, . . . , 〈B, H, Sn〉 ∈D1m(F)}. We say that F has closed one-to-many-distinguishability if 
and only if D1m(F) =D1m(F).
Proposition 21. For any learning framework F , D1m(F) =
{〈B, H, {H1, . . . , Hn}〉∣∣〈B, H, H1〉, . . . , 〈B, H, Hn〉 ∈D11(F)}.
Corollary 6. For any learning framework F , D1m(F) ⊆
{〈B, H, {H1, . . . , Hn}〉∣∣〈B, H, H1〉, . . . , 〈B, H, Hn〉 ∈D11(F)}. The equality 
holds if and only if F has closed one-to-many-distinguishability.
Note that not all learning frameworks have closed one-to-many-distinguishability; for instance, Example 12 shows that 
brave induction does not. We will show that induction of stable models, on the other hand, does have closed one-to-many-
distinguishability.
Example 12. I L Pb does not have closed one-to-many-distinguishability. We can see this by reconsidering the programs 
B = ∅, H = {1{heads,tails}1.}, H1 = {heads.} and H2 = {tails.}. 〈B, H, {H1}〉 ∈D1m(I L Pb) (〈B, 〈{tails}, ∅〉〉 distin-
guishes H from H1 wrt the background knowledge B). Similarly 〈B, H, {H2}〉 ∈D1m(I L Pb) (〈B, 〈{heads}, ∅〉〉 distinguishes H
from H2 wrt the background knowledge B). If I L Pb had closed one-to-many-distinguishability then 〈B, H, {H1, H2}〉 would 
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Assume for contradiction that there is such a task Tb . As H ∈ I L Pb(Tb) and AS(B ∪ H) = {{heads}, {tails}}, E+ ⊂
{heads, tails} and E− ⊂ {heads, tails} (neither can be equal to {heads, tails} or H would not be a solution).
Case 1: E+ = ∅
Case a: E− = ∅
Then H1 and H2 would be inductive solutions. This is a contradiction as {H1, H2} ∩ I L Pb(Tb) = ∅.
Case b: E− = {heads}
Then H2 would be an inductive solution of Tb . Contradiction.
Case c: E− = {tails}
Then H1 would be an inductive solution of Tb . Contradiction.
Case 2: E+ = {heads}
heads /∈ E− as otherwise the task would have no solutions (and we know that H is a solution). In this case H1 would 
be an inductive solution (regardless of what else is in E−). Contradiction.
Case 3: E+ = {tails}
Similarly to above case, tails /∈ E− as otherwise the task would have no solutions. In this case H2 would be an 
inductive solution (regardless of what else is in E−). Contradiction.
Hence, there is no such task Tb = 〈B, 〈E+, E−〉〉 such that H ∈ I L Pb(Tb) and {H1, H2} ∩ I L Pb(Tb) = ∅. I L Pb does not have 
closed one-to-many-distinguishability.
In contrast to I L Pb , I L Psm (which we will see does have closed one-to-many-distinguishability), can distinguish H from 
H1 and H2 with the task 〈B, 〈{〈{heads}, ∅〉, 〈{tails}, ∅〉}〉〉. Note that this is a combination of the two brave tasks which 
distinguish H from H1 and from H2. We will show that the ability to combine tasks in this way is a suﬃcient condition for 
a framework to have closed one-to-many-distinguishability. Proposition 22 shows the one-to-many-distinguishability class 
of I L Pb .
Proposition 22. D1m(I L Pb) =
{〈B, H, {h1, . . . ,hm}〉∣∣AS(B ∪ H) AS(B ∪ h1) ∪ . . . ∪ AS(B ∪ hm)} .
Proof.
1. Let B, H, h1, . . . , hm be ASP programs such that AS(B ∪ H)  AS(B ∪h1) ∪ . . .∪ AS(B ∪hm). This implies that there is an 
interpretation A that is an answer set of B ∪ H but not an answer set of any of the programs B ∪ h1, . . . , B ∪ hm . Let L
be the set of atoms which occur in at least one answer set of at least one of the programs B ∪ H, B ∪h1, . . . B ∪hm; then 
B ∪ H has an answer set that extends 〈A, L\A〉, but none of B ∪h1, . . . B ∪hm do. So the task 〈B, 〈A, L\A〉〉 distinguishes 
H from h1 to hm . Hence, 〈B, H, {h1, . . . , hm}〉 ∈D1m(I L Pb).
2. Assume 〈B, H, {h1, . . . , hm}〉 ∈D1m(I L Pb). Then there is an I L Pb task Tb = 〈B, 〈E+, E−〉〉 such that B ∪ H has an answer 
set extending 〈E+, E−〉 and none of B ∪h1, . . . , B ∪hm do. Hence, there must be at least one answer set of B ∪ H , which 
is not an answer set of any of B ∪ h1, . . . , B ∪ hm . Therefore AS(B ∪ H)  AS(B ∪ h1) ∪ . . . ∪ AS(B ∪ hm). 
For a framework F to have closed one-to-many-distinguishability it is suﬃcient (but not necessary) that for every two F
tasks, there is a third F task whose solutions are exactly those hypotheses which are solutions to both of the original two 
tasks. This is formalised and proved in Lemma 2. This condition is not necessary in general, but it holds for the frameworks 
considered in this paper that have closed one-to-many-distinguishability.
Lemma 2. For any learning framework F to have closed one-to-many-distinguishability, it is suﬃcient that for every pair of learn-
ing tasks T 1F = 〈B, E1F 〉 and T 2F = 〈B, E2F 〉 it is possible to construct a new learning task T 3F = 〈B, E3F 〉 such that I L PF (T 3F ) =
I L PF (T 1F ) ∩ I L PF (T 2F ).
Proof. Assume that for every pair of learning tasks T 1F = 〈B, E1F 〉 and T 2F = 〈B, E2F 〉 it is possible to construct a new 
learning task T 3F = 〈B, E3F 〉 such that I L PF (T 3F ) = I L PF (T 1F ) ∩ I L PF (T 2F ). Let 〈B, H, S1〉, . . . , 〈B, H, Sn〉 ∈D1m(F). To prove 
that F has closed one-to-many-distinguishability, we must show that 〈B, H, S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sn〉 ∈ D1m(F). We prove this by 
showing (by mathematical induction) that for each k ∈ [1..n], 〈B, H, S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sk〉 ∈D1m(F).
Base Case: k = 1. 〈B, H, S1〉 ∈D1m(F) by the initial assumptions.
Inductive Hypothesis: Assume that for some 0 ≤ k < n, 〈B, H, S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sk〉 ∈D1m(F).
Inductive Step: We must show that 〈B, H, S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sk+1〉 ∈D1m(F).
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and (S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sk) ∩ I L PF (T 1F ) = ∅. As 〈B, H, Sk+1〉 ∈ D1m(F), there must also be a learning task T 2F such that 
H ∈ I L PF (T 2F ) and Sk+1 ∩ I L PF (T 2F ) = ∅. By our initial assumption, there is a learning task T 3F = 〈B, E3F 〉 such that 
I L PF (T 3F ) = I L PF (T 1F ) ∩ I L PF (T 2F ). So, H ∈ I L PF (T 3F ), (S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sk) ∩ I L PF (T 3F ) = ∅ and Sk+1 ∩ I L PF (T 3F ) = ∅. There-
fore, H ∈ I L PF (T 3F ) and (S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sk+1) ∩ I L PF (T 3F ) = ∅. Hence, 〈B, H, S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sk+1〉 ∈D1m(F). 
Proposition 23. I L Pc , I L Psm, I L P LAS , I L P LO AS and I L P contextLO AS all have closed one-to-many-distinguishability.




⎩〈B, H, {H1, . . . , Hn}〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣
〈B, H, H1〉 ∈D11(F1)
. . .





⎩〈B, H, {H1, . . . , Hn}〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣
〈B, H, H1〉 ∈D11(F2)
. . .
〈B, H, Hn〉 ∈D11(F2)
⎫⎬
⎭ (by Proposition 21)
⇔D11(F1) ⊆D11(F2). 
Corollary 7. Given two frameworks F1 and F2 with closed one-to-many-distinguishability: D1m(F1) ⊂ D1m(F2) if and only if 
D11(F1) ⊂D11(F2).
Theorem 6. Consider the learning frameworks I L Pb, I L Pc , I L Psm, I L P LAS , I L P LO AS and I L P contextLO AS .
1. D1m(I L Pb) ⊂D1m(I L Psm) ⊂D1m(I L P LAS) ⊂D1m(I L P LO AS ) ⊂D1m(I L P contextLO AS )
2. D1m(I L Pc) ⊂D1m(I L P LAS )
Proof. Firstly, as shown in Example 12, D1m(I L Pb) is a strict subset of D1m(I L Pb). Hence, by Theorem 5, D1m(I L Pb) ⊂
D1m(I L Psm); and hence as I L Psm has closed one-to-many-distinguishability, D1m(I L Pb) ⊂ D1m(I L Psm). The other results all 
follow from Corollary 7 and Proposition 23. 
Even if two frameworks F1 and F2 both have closed one-to-many-distinguishability, it might not be the case that their 
combination has closed one-to-many-distinguishability. Example 13 shows, for example, that this is not the case for I L Psm
and I L Pc . We deﬁne ﬁrst what we mean by combination framework constructed from two given frameworks.
Deﬁnition 16. Given two frameworks F1 and F2, the combination framework comb(F1, F2) allows any task 〈B, 〈1, E1〉〉, 
where 〈B, E1〉 is an F1 task, and any task 〈B, 〈2, E2〉〉, where 〈B, E2〉 is an F2 task.
Given any comb(F1, F2) task T = 〈B, 〈x, E〉〉: I L Pcomb(F1,F2)(T ) =
{
I L PF1 (〈B, E〉) if x= 1
I L PF2 (〈B, E〉) if x= 2
Example 13. Consider the frameworks I L Psm and I L Pc (both of which have closed one-to-many-distinguishability). Consider 
the programs B = ∅, H = {0{p}1.} , H1 = ∅, H2 = {0{p,q}1.}. 〈B, H, H1〉 ∈D11(I L Psm) (using the task 〈B, 〈{〈{p}, ∅〉}〉〉), and 
〈B, H, H2〉 ∈ D11(I L Pc) (using the task 〈B, 〈∅, {q}〉〉). This shows that both 〈B, H, H1〉 and 〈B, H, H2〉 are in D11(I L Psm) ∪
D11(I L Pc). Hence by Deﬁnition 16 they must be in D11(comb(I L Psm, I L Pc)). But using the distinguishability conditions 
proven in the previous section, it can be seen that neither framework can distinguish H from both H1 and H2. Therefore, 
〈B, H, {H1, H2}〉 /∈ D1m(comb(I L Psm, I L Pc)). This also means that D1m(I L Psm) ∪D1m(I L Pc) is a strict subset of D1m(I L P LAS ). 
This is because D1m(I L P LAS) contains both 〈B, H, {H1}〉 and 〈B, H, {H2}〉 (as it contains both D1m(I L Psm) and D1m(I L Pc)) and 
has closed one-to-many-distinguishability, so must also contain 〈B, H, {H1, H2}〉.
5.3. The many-to-many-distinguishability class of a learning framework
So far, we have considered two main classes to deﬁne how general a learning framework is. Firstly, we discussed the 
one-to-one-distinguishability class, which is made up of tuples 〈B, H, H ′〉 such that the framework can distinguish H from 
H ′ with respect to B . We showed that this has limitations and cannot separate I L Pb and I L Psm even though I L Pb is clearly 
a special case of I L Psm . This motivated upgrading the notion of a one-to-one-distinguishability class, changing the third 
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class.
This naturally leads to the question of whether it is possible to upgrade generality classes by allowing the second element 
of the tuple to also be a set of hypotheses. Each tuple would then be of the form 〈B, S1, S2〉, where B is a background 
knowledge, and S1 and S2 are sets of hypotheses. For each tuple in this new class, a framework would be required to have 
at least one task T with the background knowledge B such that every hypothesis in S1 is an inductive solution of T , and 
no hypothesis in S2 is an inductive solution of T . Deﬁnition 17 formalises this many-to-many-distinguishability class.
Deﬁnition 17. The many-to-many-distinguishability class of a learning framework F (denoted Dmm(F)) is the set of all tuples 〈B, S1, S2〉, where B is a program and S1 and S2 are sets of hypotheses for which there is a task TF , with background 
knowledge B , such that S1 ⊆ I L PF (TF ) and S2 ∩ I L PF (TF ). Given two frameworks, F1 and F2, we say that F1 is at least 
as (resp. more) Dmm-general than F2 if and only if Dmm(F2) ⊆Dmm(F1) (resp. Dmm(F2) ⊂Dmm(F1)).
We have already seen that for any two frameworks, F1 and F2, F1 →sr F2 ⇒D1m(F1) ⊆D1m(F2) ⇒D11(F1) ⊆D11(F2). 
We have also seen that for D11-generality and D1m-generality, even if there is no corresponding strong reduction from F2 to F1 these subset relations are not necessarily strict. Proposition 24 and Corollary 8 show that Dmm-generality is equivalent to 
strong reductions.
Proposition 24. For any two learning frameworks F1 and F2 , F1 →sr F2 ⇔Dmm(F1) ⊆Dmm(F2).
Proof.
1. Assume that F1 →sr F2. Let 〈B, S1, S2〉 be an arbitrary element of Dmm(F1). By deﬁnition of Dmm(F1), there is a task TF1
with background knowledge B such that S1 ⊆ I L PF1 (TF1 ) and S2 ∩ I L PF1 (TF1 ) = ∅. Hence, as F1 →sr F2, there is an 
F2 task TF2 with background knowledge B such that S1 ⊆ I L PF2 (TF2 ) and S2 ∩ I L PF2 (TF2 ) = ∅. Hence 〈B, S1, S2〉 ∈
Dmm(F2).
2. Assume that Dmm(F1) ⊆Dmm(F2). Let TF1 be an arbitrary F1 task. We must show that there is a F2 task with the same 
background knowledge and the same inductive solutions. Let B be the background knowledge of TF1 , S1 = I L PF1 (TF1 )
and S2 be the (possibly inﬁnite) set of ASP programs which are not in S1. 〈B, S1, S2〉 ∈Dmm(F1); and hence, 〈B, S1, S2〉 ∈
Dmm(F2). Therefore, there must be at least one task TF2 with the background knowledge B such that I L PF2 (TF2 ) = S1. 
Hence, F1 →sr F2. 
Corollary 8. For any two learning frameworks F1 and F2 , F1 is more Dmm-general than F2 if and only if F2 →sr F1 and F1sr F2 .
Proposition 25. For any two frameworks F1 and F2: Dmm(F1) ⊆Dmm(F2) ⇒D1m(F1) ⊆D1m(F2).
Proof. Assume that Dmm(F1) ⊆ Dmm(F2) and let 〈B, H, S〉 ∈ D1m(F1). Then 〈B, {H}, S〉 ∈ Dmm(F1), and so 〈B, {H}, S〉 ∈
Dmm(F2). Hence, 〈B, H, S〉 ∈D1m(F2). 
Theorem 7 shows that one framework being more D1m-general than another implies that it is also more Dmm -general if 
there is a strong reduction from the second framework to the ﬁrst.
Theorem 7. For any two frameworks F1 and F2 , if F1 is more D1m-general than F2 and F2 →sr F1 then F1 is more Dmm-general 
than F2 .
Proof. Assume that F1 is more D1m-general than F2 and that F2 →sr F1. By Proposition 24, F1 is at least as Dmm -general 
as F2. It remains to show that F2 is not at least as Dmm-general as F1. Assume for contradiction that F2 is at least as 
Dmm-general as F1. Then by Proposition 25, F2 is at least as D1m-general as F1, contradicting the fact that F1 is more 
D1m-general than F2. 
Corollary 9. Consider the learning frameworks I L Pb, I L Pc , I L Psm, I L P LAS , I L P LO AS and I L P contextLO AS .
1. Dmm(I L Pb) ⊂Dmm(I L Psm) ⊂Dmm(I L P LAS ) ⊂Dmm(I L P LO AS ) ⊂Dmm(I L P contextLO AS )
2. Dmm(I L Pc) ⊂Dmm(I L P LAS)
Proof. Each result follows directly from Theorem 6, Theorem 7 and Proposition 9. 
Note that although for each pair of frameworks discussed in this paper, one being more D1m-general than another implies 
that it is also more Dmm-general, this result does not hold in general. Example 14 shows such a pair of frameworks.
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A summary of the relationships between the different measures of generality in this paper.
Property Consequences of property
F1 and F2 have equal D1m-generality F1 and F2 have equal D11-generality
F1 and F2 have equal Dmm-generality 1) F1 and F2 have equal D11-generality
2) F1 and F2 have equal D1m-generality
F1 is more D11-general than F2 Either F1 is more D1m-general than F2 or F1 and F2 have incomparable 
D1m-generality
F1 is more D1m-general than F2 1) Either F1 is more Dmm-general than F2 or F1 and F2 have incomparable 
Dmm-generality
2) F1 is at least as D11-general as F2
F1 is more Dmm-general than F2 1) F1 is at least as D11-general as F2
2) F1 is at least as D1m-general as F2
F1 is at least as D1m-general as F2 F1 is at least as D11-general as F2
F1 is at least as Dmm-general as F2 1) F1 is at least as D11-general as F2
2) F1 is at least as D1m-general as F2
F1 and F2 have different D11-generality 1) F1 and F2 have different D1m-generality
2) F1 and F2 have different Dmm-generality
F1 and F2 have different D1m-generality F1 and F2 have different Dmm-generality
F1 and F2 have incomparable D11-generality 1) F1 and F2 have incomparable D1m-generality
2) F1 and F2 have incomparable Dmm-generality
F1 and F2 have incomparable D1m-generality F1 and F2 have incomparable Dmm-generality
Example 14. Consider a new learning framework I L Pd that takes as examples a pair of sets of atoms E+ and E− such that 
a hypothesis H is an inductive solution of a task if B ∪ H has exactly one answer set and this answer set contains all of 
the E+ ’s and none of the E− ’s. The one-to-one-distinguishability class D11(I L Pd) ⊆D11(I L Pc). This can be seen as follows: 
assume that 〈B, H, H ′〉 ∈D11(I L Pd). Then there is a task Td = 〈B, 〈E+, E−〉〉 such that H ∈ I L Pd(Td) but H ′ /∈ I L Pd(Td).
Case 1: AS(B ∪ H ′) = ∅
Let Tc = 〈B, 〈E+, E−〉〉. As B ∪ H has exactly one answer set, and this answer set covers the examples, H ∈ I L Pc(Tc). As 
AS(B ∪ H ′) = ∅, H ′ /∈ I L Pc(Tc). Hence, 〈B, H, H ′〉 ∈D11(I L Pc).
Case 2: B ∪ H ′ has exactly one answer set, and this answer set does not cover the examples.
Let Tc = 〈B, 〈E+, E−〉〉. As B ∪ H has exactly one answer set, and this answer set covers the examples, H ∈ I L Pc(Tc). As 
B ∪ H ′ has an answer set that does not cover the examples, H ′ /∈ I L Pc(Tc). Hence, 〈B, H, H ′〉 ∈D11(I L Pc).
Case 3: B ∪ H ′ has multiple answer sets.
There must be at least one answer set A∗ of B ∪ H ′ that is not an answer set of B ∪ H (as B ∪ H only has one answer 
set). There must either be an atom a ∈ A∗ that is not in the unique answer set of B ∪ H , or an atom a that is not in A∗ , 
but is in the unique answer set of B ∪ H . In the ﬁrst case, let E+c = ∅ and E−c = {a}. In the second case, let E+c = {a}
and E−c = ∅. Then let Tc = 〈B, 〈E+c , E−c 〉〉. H ∈ I L Pc(Tc) as the only answer set of B ∪ H covers the examples, whereas 
H ′ /∈ I L Pc(Tc) as B ∪ H ′ has at least one answer set that does not cover the examples. Hence, 〈B, H, H ′〉 ∈D11(I L Pc).
In fact, D11(I L Pd) is a strict subset of D11(I L Pc) as D11(I L Pd) has no elements 〈B, H, H ′〉 where B ∪ H has multiple answer 
sets. As I L Pc is closed under one-to-many-distinguishability, and all one-to-many-distinguishability classes are subsets of 
their own closure, this means that I L Pc is more D1m-general than I L Pd (by Theorem 5).
I L Pc is not, however, more Dmm-general than I L Pd . Take, for instance, the tuple t = 〈∅, {{heads.}, {tails.}},
{{1{heads,tails}1.}}〉. The empty set of examples are suﬃcient for I L Pd to distinguish both hypotheses containing 
facts from the choice rule (as the choice rule has multiple answer sets). However, there is no I L Pc task such that both facts 
are solutions, but the choice rule is not. Hence, t ∈Dmm(I L Pd) but t /∈Dmm(I L Pc); and so, I L Pc is not at least as Dmm -general 
as I L Pd . In fact, as I L Pd is not as Dmm-general as I L Pc either, the two have incomparable Dmm -generalities.
Example 14 shows that Dmm-generality may not be able to compare two frameworks even when there is a clear 
D1m-generality relation between the two. In the next section, we discuss relationships between, and the relative merits 
of using, each measure of generality.
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Table 4 summarises the relationships between the different measures of generality presented in this paper. It shows that 
equal one-to-one-distinguishability is weaker than equal one-to-many-distinguishability, which is weaker than equal many-
to-many-distinguishability. This can be seen from the ﬁrst section of the table, as equal many-to-many-distinguishability 
implies equal one-to-many-distinguishability, which implies equal one-to-one-distinguishability, but the converse implica-
tions do not hold in general. On the other hand different one-to-one-distinguishability is stronger than different one-to-
many-distinguishability, which in turn is stronger than different many-to-many-distinguishability. This means that many-
to-many-distinguishability (resp. one-to-many-distinguishability) will be able to “separate” frameworks that one-to-many-
distinguishability (resp. one-to-one-distinguishability) can not; but, there are more frameworks that are incomparable under 
many-to-many-distinguishability (resp. one-to-many-distinguishability) than one-to-many-distinguishability (resp. one-to-
one-distinguishability).
The different notions of generalities will never be inconsistent, in the sense that one will never say that F1 is more 
general than F2, while the other says that F2 is more general than F1. It is useful, however, to explain the tasks that the 
different measures of generality correspond to.
1. One-to-one-distinguishability describes how general a framework is at distinguishing one hypothesis from another.
2. One-to-many-distinguishability describes how general a framework is at the task of identifying one target hypothesis 
within a space of unwanted hypotheses.
3. Many-to-many-distinguishability describes how general a framework is for the task of identifying a set of target hy-
potheses – for any background knowledge B and set of hypotheses S , there is a task TF with background knowledge 
B such that I L PF (TF ) = S if and only if 〈B, S, ¯S〉 ∈Dmm(F), where S¯ is the (inﬁnite) set of hypotheses which are not 
in S .
In practice, as ILP usually addresses the task of ﬁnding a single target hypothesis from a space of other hypotheses, one-
to-many-distinguishability is likely to be the most useful measure; however, one-to-one-distinguishability classes are useful 
for ﬁnding the one-to-many-distinguishability classes of frameworks, and many-to-many-distinguishability is interesting as 
a theoretical property.
5.4.1. More general learning frameworks
We have shown in this section that I L P contextLO AS is more general (under every measure) than any of the other tasks pre-
sented for learning under the answer set semantics. The obvious question is whether it is possible to go further and deﬁne 
more general learning tasks.
The most D11-general learning task possible would be able to distinguish between any two different ASP programs H1
and H2 with respect to any background knowledge B . This would require the learning task to distinguish between programs 
which are strongly equivalent, such as {p. q:- p.} and {p:- q. q.}. We would argue that this level of one-to-one-
distinguishability is unnecessary as in ILP, we aim to learn programs whose output explains the examples. As two strongly 
equivalent programs will always have the same output, even when combined with additional programs providing “context”, 
we can not see any reason for going further under D11-generality. As I L P contextLO AS has closed one-to-many-distinguishability, 
the same argument can be made for D1m-generality.
One outstanding question is whether it is worth going any further under Dmm -generality. Note that it is possible to deﬁne 
the notion of the closure of many-to-many-distinguishability classes; however, none of the frameworks considered in this 
paper have closed many-to-many-distinguishability. It is unclear whether having closed many-to-many-distinguishability 
is a desirable property for a framework. Closed one-to-many-distinguishability means that a framework can distinguish a 
target hypothesis H from any set of hypotheses S such that it can distinguish H from each element of S: this means 
that the sets of examples that distinguish H from each element of S can be combined to form a single set of examples, 
ruling out each element of S . For a framework to have closed many-to-many-distinguishability, however, given two (or 
more) target hypotheses h1, h2 that can be distinguished from an undesirable hypothesis h3 , it would need to be able 
to ﬁnd a task which distinguished both h1 and h2 from h3. For example, as both 〈∅, {heads.}, {1{heads,tails}1.}〉
and 〈∅, {tails.}, {1{heads,tails}1.}〉 are in D11(I L P LAS), for I L P LAS to have closed many-to-many-distinguishability it 
would need to be able to ﬁnd a task with an empty background knowledge that distinguishes both {heads.} and {tails.}
from {1{heads,tails}1.}. It is diﬃcult to imagine a scenario, however, where we should learn either the hypothesis that 
a coin is always heads or always tails, when the choice rule is not a desirable hypothesis.
5.4.2. The generality of noisy frameworks
As discussed in Section 4.4 some learning systems are able to solve tasks where examples are potentially noisy – in 
this case, not all examples should necessarily be covered, and there is a trade off between maximising coverage and not 
over-ﬁtting the examples. One method, used by the XHAIL [42] and ILASP [32] systems is to penalise a hypothesis for 
each example that is not covered. Examples are given a positive integer penalty, which must be paid if the example is not 
covered.
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case of one-to-one-distinguishability we could deﬁne the “noisy” one-to-one-distinguishability class of a learning framework 
as the set of tuples 〈B, H1, H2〉, for which there is a set of examples E such that p(H1, E) < p(H2, E), where p(H, E) is 
the total penalty paid by a hypothesis H (together with the background knowledge B) over the examples E . In fact, we 
now show that this extended notion of one-to-one-distinguishability class would be equivalent to the standard “non-noisy” 
one-to-one-distinguishability class.
As all penalties are positive, p(H1, E) < p(H2, E) implies that p(H1, E ′) < p(H2, E ′), where E ′ the set of all examples in 
E that are covered by H . Hence, there is a set of examples E ′ such that H1 every example in E ′, but H2 does not. This 
means that any 〈B, H1, H2〉 that would be in the “noisy” one-to-one-distinguishability class is in the standard “non-noisy” 
one-to-one-distinguishability class. Similarly for any tuple 〈B, H1, H2〉 in the standard one-to-one-distinguishability class, 
there is a set of examples E such that H1 covers every example in E , and H2 does not; hence p(H1, E) < p(H2, E), and so 
〈B, H1, H2〉 would be in the “noisy” one-to-one-distinguishability class.
A similar argument holds for the one-to-many-distinguishability class; however, it is worth noting that it does not hold 
true for the many-to-many-distinguishability class. If we upgrade the many-to-many-distinguishability class in the same 
way then there are some tuples which are in the “noisy” many-to-many-distinguishability class for a framework, but not 
in the standard many-to-many-distinguishability class. Take for instance the example discussed in the previous section: 
〈∅, {{heads.}, {tails.}}, {1{heads,tails}1.}〉 is not in Dmm(I L P LAS ). However, if we consider the I L P LAS examples 
E = 〈∅, {〈{heads}, ∅〉, 〈{tails}, ∅〉〉, then p({heads.}, E) = 1, p({tails.}, E) = 1 and p({1{heads,tails}1.}, E) = 2, 
meaning that 〈∅, {{heads.}, {tails.}}, {1{heads,tails}1.}〉 would be in the “noisy” Dmm(I L P LAS ).
6. Related work
The complexity of I L Pb and I L Pc for veriﬁcation and satisﬁability were investigated in [28]. However, in that work, the 
results on satisﬁability are for deciding whether or not a task has any solutions with no restrictions on the hypothesis space. 
This means that for both I L Pb and I L Pc deciding whether a task is satisﬁable is equivalent to checking whether there is a 
model of B in which the examples are covered (a simpler decision problem). For this reason, the complexity of satisﬁability 
for I L Pc in [28] was NP -complete, rather than P2 -complete. The complexities given of veriﬁcation of a hypothesis given 
in [28] are also different from the ones in this paper, as they consider a different language for B ∪ H . They consider 
disjunctive logic programs, whereas we investigated the complexity of learning programs without disjunction. The reason 
we chose not to consider disjunctive logic programs is that the systems available for ILP under the answer set semantics do 
not allow disjunction. For example, the systems for I L Pb [38,39] do not allow disjunction, and allowing disjunction would 
raise the complexity beyond the complexity of the tasks that are actually solved in practice by the existing systems.
As discussed in Section 5, the generality of a learning framework has been investigated before. In [45], the author deﬁned 
generality in terms of reductions – one framework F1 was said to be more general than another framework F2 if and only 
if F2 →r F1 and F1 r F2. We showed in Section 5 that our ﬁnal notion of generality (many-to-many-distinguishability) 
coincides with a similar notion of strong reductions. The difference with strong reductions, as compared to the reductions 
in [45], is that strong reductions do not allow the background knowledge to be modiﬁed as part of the reduction. We 
showed in Example 8 that I L Pb reduces to I L Pc , but I L Pb does not strongly reduce to I L Pc . This is because any reduction 
from I L Pb to I L Pc must encode the examples in the background knowledge, which we would argue abuses the purpose of 
the background knowledge.
Aside from the differences in strong reductions and reductions, we discussed in Section 5 that one-to-many-
distinguishability is more relevant when comparing the generalities of frameworks with respect to the task of ﬁnding 
a single hypothesis within a space of hypotheses. The reductions of [45] are closer to the notion of many-to-many-
distinguishability, because they compare the set of solutions.
One key advantage to using our three notions of generality, rather than strong reductions or reductions, is for comparing 
the relative generalities of frameworks that do not strongly reduce to one another. For instance, we have seen that I L Pb
and I L Pc are incomparable under D-generality, but we can still reason that I L Pb is never D-general enough to distinguish 
a hypothesis containing a constraint from the same hypothesis without the constraint. On the other hand, I L Pc may be 
D-general enough to do so (for example, I L Pc can distinguish {:- p.} from ∅ with respect to the background knowledge 
{0{p}1.}, with the task 〈{0{p}1.}, 〈∅, {p}〉〉).
6.1. Other learning frameworks
Traditional ILP aims to learn Prolog style logic programs, often restricted to learning deﬁnite programs (with no negation 
as failure). For the shared subset of the languages learned by these ILP frameworks and the ASP frameworks (deﬁnite rules, 
not including lists), a deﬁnite learning task can be expressed as either a brave, or as a cautious task with the same examples 
as the deﬁnite task, and hypothesis space restricted to deﬁnite logic programs. As these frameworks do not support features 
such as choice rules or constraints or negation, and ASP frameworks do not support lists, a comparison of the generality 
is not very informative. A review of early efforts to extend ILP to learn normal logic programs was presented in [8]. The 
techniques discussed in [8] that operate under the stable model (or answer set) semantics require that all examples are 
covered in all stable models (or answer sets). This corresponds to cautious induction.
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in sections 4 and 5 how the complexity and generality of these frameworks compare to our own frameworks. In particular, 
we have shown that although the complexities of our three learning frameworks (I L P LAS , I L P LO AS and I L P contextLO AS ) are the 
same as cautious induction, there are some learning problems which can be represented in learning from answer sets that 
cannot be represented in either brave or cautious induction. One example of this is the learning of the rules of Sudoku. 
This is because brave induction cannot incentivise learning the constraints in the rules of Sudoku, and there are no useful 
examples that can be given to a cautious learner about the values of cells, since no cell has the same value in every valid 
Sudoku board.
Another early work on learning frameworks under the answer set semantics is Induction from Answer Sets [46]. In the 
paper, two learning algorithms I AS pos and I ASneg are presented. The task of I AS pos is to learn a hypothesis that cautiously 
entails a set of examples. This corresponds to the task of cautious induction. I ASneg on the other hand aims to ﬁnd a 
hypothesis that does not cautiously entail each of a set of examples (i.e. there should be at least one answer set that does 
not contain each example). This is (in some sense reversed) brave induction. As shown in the paper, in general the I AS pos
and I ASneg procedures are cannot be combined in general to compute a correct hypothesis.
Another framework, under the supported model semantics rather than the answer set semantics, is Learning from Inter-
pretation Transitions (LFIT) [47]. In LFIT, the examples are pairs of interpretations 〈I, J 〉 where J is the set of immediate 
consequences of I given B ∪ H . In [24], we presented a mapping from any LFIT task to an I L P contextL AS task. This shows that 
the complexity of deciding both satisﬁability and veriﬁcation for LFIT is at most P2 -complete. The generality, on the other 
hand would be different to the tasks we have considered, since there are programs that are strongly equivalent under the 
answer sets semantics that have different supported models. Example 15 demonstrates a pair of such programs, and an 
example that learning from interpretations could use to distinguish between them.
Example 15. Consider the programs P1 and P2.
P1 = {p:- p.}
P2 = ∅
P1 and P2 are strongly equivalent under the answer set semantics. However, P1 has the supported model {p}, whereas P2
does not. LFIT can distinguish P1 from P2 (with respect to an empty background knowledge) with the example 〈{p}, {p}〉.
Example 15 shows that I L P contextLO AS has a distinguishability class which does not contain LFIT’s distinguishability class. 
Conversely, LFIT cannot have a distinguishability class which contains D11(I L P contextLO AS ), as it cannot distinguish hypotheses 
containing weak constraints from the same hypotheses without the weak constraints. In fact, it does not even contain 
D11(I L P LAS), as shown in Example 16.










For both programs P1 and P2, the immediate consequences of any interpretation I is the set {p}. This means that no 
example could possibly distinguish P1 from P2 with respect to an empty background knowledge. Under the answer set 
semantics, however, P1 has one answer set {p}, but P2 has no answer sets. I L P LAS can therefore distinguish P1 from P2
(with respect to the empty background knowledge), with the positive example 〈{p}, ∅〉.
I L P LAS , I L P LO AS and I L P contextLO AS have different distinguishability classes to LFIT, but none is either more or less 
D11-general than LFIT. This is an interesting observation, as it demonstrates that even when two frameworks are incom-
parable under our measures of generality, we can still reason about their individual distinguishability classes and discuss 
hypotheses which one framework is powerful enough to distinguish between and another is not. For instance, I L P LAS can-
not distinguish between any two hypotheses that are strongly equivalent under the answer set semantics, but Example 15
shows that there are some cases where I L P LF IT can.
6.2. Relation to probabilistic ILP
One of the advantages to learning ASP programs rather than Prolog programs is that ASP allows the modeling of non-
determinism, either through unstratiﬁed negation or through choice rules. The latter can be seen in the coin examples 
throughout the paper, where we have shown that our I L P LAS framework can learn that a coin can be either heads or tails, 
but not both.
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ming [48] is a combination of ILP with probabilistic reasoning. Its aim is to learn a logic program that is annotated with 
probabilities. The task of PILP is often divided into structure learning, where the underlying logic program is learned, and 
parameter estimation or weight learning, where the probabilities are learned. A key difference between I L P LAS and PILP is 
that while both aim to learn programs which are non-deterministic, I L P LAS aims to learn programs whose answer sets 
capture the set of possibilities, whereas PILP aims to learn a probability distribution over these possibilities.
Although there has been signiﬁcant progress in the ﬁeld of PILP [25,49–51,26] for learning annotated Prolog programs, 
PILP under the answer set semantics is still relatively young, and thus, there are few approaches. PrASP [52,53,27] considers 
the problem of weight learning, and in fact uses a similar example of learning about coins. This example illustrates the 
difference between weight learning and standard ILP. In ILP our task is to learn that there are exactly two possibilities 
(heads and tails); whereas in weight learning, the goal is to estimate probabilities of each possibility. PROBXHAIL [54]
does attempt to combine structure learning and weight learning, but can only learn deﬁnite logic programs.
While the coin example used in this paper may be viewed as inherently probabilistic, there are situations in practice 
where we may wish to learn non-deterministic programs without considering probability; for instance, in policy learning. A 
policy may well permit many valid actions in a given scenario, and impose some constraints on these actions. The task is 
to learn a program whose answer sets reﬂect the set of valid options, rather than to estimate the probability of each action 
being taken.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the complexity and generality of the state of the art frameworks for learning answer 
set programs. We have shown, for the two decision problems of veriﬁcation that a hypothesis is an inductive solution 
of a task and deciding whether a given task is satisﬁable, that brave induction (I L Pb) and induction of stable models 
(I L Psm) have the same complexities, and that cautious induction (I L Pc ), learning from answer sets (I L P LAS ), learning from 
ordered answer sets (I L P LO AS ) and context dependent learning from ordered answer sets (I L P contextLO AS ) also have the same 
complexities as each other, but higher than I L Pb and I L Psm . Studying the complexity of decision problems for the learning 
frameworks is important, as it gives a sense of the price paid for choosing a particular framework. In contrast, generality 
is important, as it shows the advantages of choosing one framework over another, by specifying which hypotheses can be 
learned by each framework. When using ILP in practice, a trade off must be made between the complexity and generality 
of the framework. The generality classes presented in this paper can inform this decision, as it is likely to be inﬂuenced by 
the class of programs that must be learned.
We have introduced three new measures of generality (D11-generality, D1m-generality and Dmm-generality), and shown 
that, both under our own measures of generality, and by using the concept of strong reductions, there is an ordering of 
the generalities of the frameworks considered in this paper. Although I L Pc , I L P LAS , I L P LO AS and I L P contextLO AS have the same 
computational complexities, I L Pc is less general than I L P LAS , which is less general than I L P LO AS , which is less general than 
I L P contextLO AS , under each measure of generality. This ordering could have been seen using strong reductions, but our measures 
go further. They allow us to reason about why one framework is more D11-general than another, for example, by studying 
the class of tuples which are in one framework’s distinguishability class, but not the others. They also allow us to discuss 
the generalities of frameworks which are incomparable under strong reductions; for example, there is no strong reduction 
from I L Pc to I L Pb , or from I L Pb to I L Pc . Our measures allow us to show, however, that I L Pb is not D11-general enough to 
distinguish a hypothesis containing a constraint from the same program without the constraint, but in some cases I L Pc is 
D11-general enough to do so.
In this paper, most of the results we have presented have addressed non-noisy learning frameworks. In general our ILASP 
systems do support noise, by allowing examples to be labeled with a penalty. In this case, ILASP searches for a hypothesis 
that minimises the sum |H | + p(H, E), where p(H, E) is the sum of all examples in a set E that are not covered by a 
hypothesis H . Such a hypothesis is called an optimal solution. For the two decision problems of veriﬁcation and satisﬁability, 
we have shown that the complexity results are unaffected. In current work we are investigating whether the complexities 
of the non-noisy frameworks and the noisy frameworks differ for the decision problem of verifying that a hypothesis is an 
optimal solution of a given task. In future work, we also hope to “upgrade” the propositional complexity results presented 
in this paper to apply to the learning of ﬁrst order answer set programs.
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A.1. Proofs from Section 4
In this section, we present the proofs that were omitted from Section 4. In some of the proofs, we make use of predicate 
symbols to avoid continually introducing new atoms and to aid readability. As this section is restricted to propositional 
programs, any ﬁrst order atom should be interpreted as a new propositional atom.
Proposition 1.
1. Deciding both veriﬁcation and satisﬁability for I L Pb reduces polynomially to the corresponding I L Psm decision problem.
2. Deciding both veriﬁcation and satisﬁability for I L Psm reduces polynomially to the corresponding I L Pb decision problem.
Proof.
1. Let Tb = 〈B, SM , 〈E+, E−〉〉 be any arbitrary I L Pb task.
Consider the task Tsm = 〈B, SM , 〈{〈E+, E−〉}〉〉. ∀H , H ∈ I L Psm(Tsm) if and only if H ∈ I L Pb(Tb) and hence deciding 
veriﬁcation for I L Pb reduces polynomially to deciding veriﬁcation for I L Psm . Similarly, as I L Psm(Tsm) = I L Pb(Tb), Tsm
is satisﬁable if and only if Tb is satisﬁable; hence, deciding satisﬁability for I L Pb reduces to deciding satisﬁability for 
I L Psm .
2. Let Tsm = 〈B, SM , 〈E〉〉 be any arbitrary I L Psm task.
Let n = |E|, where E = {e1, . . . , en}.
For each integer i from 1 to n, let f i be a function which maps each atom a in B ∪ SM to a new atom ai . We also 
extend this notation to work on sets of atoms and rules (and parts of rules) by replacing each atom a in the set or rule 
with f i(a).
For each rule R ∈ SM , deﬁne a new atom in_hR .
Consider the task Tb = 〈Bb, SbM , 〈E+, E−〉〉 where the components of the task are as follows (append(R, a) is the rule R








































For any solution H of Tb , deﬁne g(H) to be {R | in_hR ∈ H}. We now show that I L Psm(Tsm) = {g(H ′) | H ′ ∈ I L Pb(Tb)}.
Assume H ∈ I L Psm(Tsm)
⇔ H ⊆ SM and ∀ei ∈ E, ∃A ∈ AS(B ∪ H) such that A extends ei .
⇔ H ⊆ SM and ∀ei ∈ E, ∃A ∈ AS( f i(B ∪ H)) such that A extends 〈{ f i(inc) | inc ∈ einci }, { f i(exc) | exc ∈ eexci }〉.⇔ H ⊆ SM and ∃A ∈ AS({ f i(B ∪ H) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}) such that A extends 〈E+, E−〉 (as the atoms in each sub program are 
disjoint).
⇔ H ⊆ SM and ∃A ∈ AS(Bb ∪ {in_hR | R ∈ H}) such that A extends 〈E+, E−〉 (by the splitting set theorem, using 
{in_hR | R ∈ H} as a splitting set).
⇔ ∃H ′ ⊆ SbM such that g(H ′) = H and ∃A ∈ AS(Bb ∪ H ′) such that A extends 〈E+, E−〉⇔ ∃H ′ ∈ I L Pb(Tb) such that g(H ′) = H
⇔ H ∈ {g(H ′) | H ′ ∈ I L Pb(Tb)}
∀H , H ∈ I L Psm(Tsm) if and only if g(H) ∈ I L Pb(Tb) and hence deciding veriﬁcation for I L Psm reduces polynomially to 
deciding veriﬁcation for I L Pb . Similarly, as I L Psm(Tsm) = {g(H) | H ∈ I L Pb(Tb)}, Tsm is satisﬁable if and only if Tb is 
satisﬁable; hence, deciding satisﬁability for I L Pb reduces to deciding satisﬁability for I L Psm . 
Proposition 2.
1. Deciding both veriﬁcation and satisﬁability for I L Pc reduces polynomially to the corresponding I L P LAS decision problem.
2. Deciding both veriﬁcation and satisﬁability for I L P LAS reduces polynomially to the corresponding I L P context decision problem.LO AS
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4. Deciding both veriﬁcation and satisﬁability for I L P LO AS reduces polynomially to the corresponding I L P sLAS decision problem.
Proof.
1. Let Tc be any I L Pc task 〈B, SM , 〈E+, E−〉〉.
Consider the I L P LAS task TLAS = 〈B, SM , 〈{〈∅, ∅〉}, {〈∅, {e+}〉 | e+ ∈ E+} ∪ {〈{e−}, ∅〉 | e− ∈ E−}〉〉.
By the deﬁnition of I L P LAS , H ∈ I L P LAS if and only if H ⊆ SM ; ∃A ∈ AS(B ∪ H) such that A extends 〈∅, ∅〉; ∀e+ ∈ E+ , 
A ∈ AS(B ∪ H) such that A extends 〈∅, e+〉; and ﬁnally, ∀e− ∈ E− , A ∈ AS(B ∪ H) such that A extends 〈e−, ∅〉.
This is true if and only if H ⊆ SM , B ∪ H is satisﬁable, ∀e+ ∈ E+ ∀A ∈ AS(B ∪ H), e+ ∈ A and ∀e− ∈ E− ∀A ∈ AS(B ∪ H)
e− /∈ A. This is the deﬁnition of H being a member of I L Pc(Tc); hence, I L Pc(Tc) = I L P LAS(TLAS ).
As I L Pc(Tc) = I L P LAS (TLAS ), Tc is satisﬁable if and only if TLAS is satisﬁable. Hence deciding the satisﬁability of an I L Pc
task can be reduced to deciding the satisﬁability of an I L P LAS task in polynomial time. Similarly, for any hypothesis H , 
H ∈ I L Pc(Tc) if and only if H ∈ I L P LAS (TLAS ); and so deciding veriﬁcation for I L Pc reduces polynomially to deciding 
veriﬁcation for I L P LAS .
2. Let TLAS be any I L P LAS task 〈B, SM , 〈E+, E−〉〉. Consider the I L P LO AS task TLO AS = 〈B, SM , 〈E+, E−, ∅, ∅〉〉.
I L P LAS(TLAS ) = I L P LO AS (TLO AS ) and hence, TLAS is satisﬁable if and only if TLO AS is satisﬁable. Hence deciding the 
satisﬁability of I L P LAS reduces polynomially to deciding satisﬁability for I L P LO AS . Similarly, for any hypothesis H , 
H ∈ I L P LAS(TLAS ) if and only if H ∈ I L P LO AS (TLO AS); and so deciding veriﬁcation for I L P LAS reduces polynomially to 
deciding veriﬁcation for I L P LO AS .
3. In [24], we presented a mapping from any I L P contextLO AS task to an I L P LO AS task. The correctness of this mapping is proven 
in Theorem 1 of [24]. Given any I L P contextLO AS task, we can decide its satisﬁability by using this mapping and checking the 
satisﬁability of the resulting I L P LO AS task. Similarly, given any hypothesis and I L P contextLO AS task, we can verify that the 
hypothesis is an inductive solution of the task by using the mapping. Hence, both satisﬁability and veriﬁcation for 
I L P contextLO AS reduce to satisﬁability and veriﬁcation (respectively), for I L P LO AS .
4. We do this by translating an arbitrary I L P LO AS task TLO AS = 〈B, SM , 〈E+, E−, Ob, Oc〉〉 to an I L P sLAS task. Before we do 
this, we deﬁne several new atoms used in our meta representation.
For i ∈ {1, 2}, let f i be a function which maps each atom a in B ∪ SM to a new atom ai . We also extend this notation 
to work on sets of atoms and rules (and parts of rules) by replacing each atom a in the set or rule with f i(a).
For each rule R ∈ SM , deﬁne a new atom in_hR .
For each weak constraint W ∈ B ∪ SM let id1(W ) and id2(W ) be two new (propositional) atoms and let wt(W ) be the 
weight of W and priority(W ) be the priority level of W .




#sum{id1(W1) = wt(W1), . . . ,id1(Wn) = wt(Wn),
id2(W1) = −wt(W1), . . . ,id2(Wn) = −wt(Wn)} < 0.
non_dom_lv(t1,t2,l):-
#sum{id1(W1) = wt(W1), . . . ,id1(Wn) = wt(Wn),




l is a priority level in B ∪ SM ,
W1 . . .Wn are the weak






∣∣∣∣ l1, l2 are levels in B ∪ SM ,l1 < l2
}
Consider the task T sLAS = 〈B ′, S ′M , 〈E+′, E−′〉〉 where the individual components are deﬁned below. For the positive and 
negative examples, it is a simple reiﬁcation so that the examples relate to the new B ′ and S ′M . The brave orderings 
are mapped to positive examples which can only be covered by a hypothesis H if B ∪ H bravely respects the ordering 
example. For any hypothesis H ′ ∈ S ′M , the f1 and f2 in a single answer set of B ′ ∪ H ′ represent two answer sets of 
B ∪ H where H is the hypothesis in SM corresponding to H ′ . Similarly, cautious orderings are mapped to negative 
examples, such that there is an answer set of B ′ ∪ H ′ which extends the example if there is a pair of answer sets of the 
corresponding B ∪ H which are ordered incorrectly (i.e. if B ∪ H does not cautiously respect the ordering).
B ′ = { f i(R)|R ∈ B, R is not a weak constraint, i ∈ {1,2}}
∪ {idi(W ):- f i(body(W )).|W is a weak constraint in B, i ∈ {1,2}}
∪ {append( f i(R), in_hR)|R ∈ SM , R is not a weak constraint }
∪ {idi(W ):- append( f i(body(W )), in_hW ).|W is a weak constraint in SM , i ∈ {1,2}}
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∪{dom:- dom(1,2). dom:- dom(2,1).}
S ′M = {in_hR |R ∈ SM}
E+′ = { f1(e+)∣∣e+ ∈ E+}
∪
{
〈 f1(einc1 ) ∪ f2(einc2 ) ∪ {dom(1,2)}, f1(eexc1 ) ∪ f2(eexc2 )〉




〈 f1(einc1 ) ∪ f2(einc2 ), f1(eexc1 ) ∪ f2(eexc2 ) ∪ {dom(2,1)}〉




〈 f1(einc1 ) ∪ f2(einc2 ) ∪ {dom}, f1(eexc1 ) ∪ f2(eexc2 )〉




〈 f1(einc1 ) ∪ f2(einc2 ) ∪ {dom(2,1)}, f1(eexc1 ) ∪ f2(eexc2 )〉




〈 f1(einc1 ) ∪ f2(einc2 ), f1(eexc1 ) ∪ f2(eexc2 ) ∪ {dom(1,2)}〉




〈 f1(einc1 ) ∪ f2(einc2 ), f1(eexc1 ) ∪ f2(eexc2 ) ∪ {dom}〉
∣∣∣〈〈einc1 , eexc1 〉, 〈einc2 , eexc2 〉,=〉 ∈ Ob
}
E−′ = { f1(e−)∣∣e− ∈ E−}
∪
{
〈 f1(einc1 ) ∪ f2(einc2 ), f1(eexc1 ) ∪ f2(eexc2 ) ∪ {dom(1,2)}〉




〈 f1(einc1 ) ∪ f2(einc2 ) ∪ {dom(2,1)}, f1(eexc1 ) ∪ f2(eexc2 )〉




〈 f1(einc1 ) ∪ f2(einc2 ), f1(eexc1 ) ∪ f2(eexc2 ) ∪ {dom}〉




〈 f1(einc1 ) ∪ f2(einc2 ), f1(eexc1 ) ∪ f2(eexc2 ) ∪ {dom(2,1)}〉




〈 f1(einc1 ) ∪ f2(einc2 ) ∪ {dom(1,2)}, f1(eexc1 ) ∪ f2(eexc2 )〉




〈 f1(einc1 ) ∪ f2(einc2 ) ∪ {dom}, f1(eexc1 ) ∪ f2(eexc2 )〉
∣∣∣〈〈einc1 , eexc1 〉, 〈einc2 , eexc2 〉,=〉 ∈ Oc
}
By using the splitting set theorem [35], it can be shown that for any H ′ ∈ S ′M :





⎝ f1(A1) ∪ f2(A2)∪dominates(1,2) ∪ dominates(2,1)
∪{dom:- dom(1,2). dom:- dom(2,1).}
⎞
⎠ , A1, A2 ∈ AS(B ∪ H)
⎫⎬
⎭
Hence, as the rules in dominates(t1, t2) describe exactly the behaviour of the weak constraints in B ∪ H for two answer 
sets (with dom(t1,t2) being true if and only if the ﬁrst answer set dominates the second):
AS(B ′ ∪ H ′) = {A′∣∣A = f1(A1) ∪ f2(A2), A1, A2 ∈ AS(B ∪ H)}, where A′ is A augmented with dom and dom(1,2) when 
A1 dominates A2 and dom and dom(2,1) when A2 dominates A1.
For any hypothesis H ′ ∈ S ′M , let H be the corresponding hypothesis in SM . The answer sets of B ′ ∪ H ′ correspond to the 
pairs of answer sets of B ∪ H .
Each positive example e+ ∈ E+ is mapped to an example in E+′ ensuring that at least one of the pairs of answer sets’ 
ﬁrst answer set covers e+ . Note that as each answer set of B ∪ H must be the ﬁrst element of one of these pairs at 
least once, this is true if and only if B ∪ H covers each positive example.
Similarly each negative example e− ∈ E− is mapped to an example in E−′ ensuring that none of the pairs of answer 
sets’ ﬁrst answer set covers e− . This is true if and only if B ∪ H does not cover any negative examples.
Each brave ordering example 〈e1, e2, op〉 ∈ Ob is mapped to a positive example ensuring that there is a pair of answer 
sets 〈A1, A2〉 of B ∪ H such that A1 covers e1, A2 covers e2 and 〈A1, A2, op〉 ∈ ord(B ∪ H). This is true if and only if 
B ∪ H bravely respects the ordering example.
Each cautious ordering example 〈e1, e2, op〉 ∈ Oc is mapped to a negative example ensuring that there is no pair of 
answer sets 〈A1, A2〉 of B ∪ H such that A1 covers e1, A2 covers e2 and 〈A1, A2, op〉 /∈ ord(B ∪ H). This is true if and 
only if B ∪ H cautiously respects the ordering example.
Hence, H ′ is an inductive solution of I L P sLAS(〈B ′, S ′M , 〈E+
′
, E−′〉〉) if and only if H is an inductive solution of 
I L P LO AS (〈B, SM , 〈E+, E−, Ob, Oc〉〉).
This means that we can check the satisﬁability of any I L P LO AS task (and similarly verify a solution) by mapping the 
task to an I L P sLAS task as above. Note that this is a well deﬁned I L P
s
LAS task as B contains only stratiﬁed aggregates.
As this mapping is polynomial in size of the original task, this means that veriﬁcation and satisﬁability for I L P LO AS
each reduces polynomially to the corresponding decision problem for I L P sLAS . 
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Proof. Let Tb be any I L Pb task 〈B, SM , 〈E+, E−〉〉. For any H ⊆ SM , H ∈ I L Pb(Tb) if and only if B ∪ H ∪ {:- not e+. |
e+ ∈ E+} ∪ {:- e−. | e− ∈ E−} is satisﬁable. As deciding the satisﬁability of this program is N P -complete (B ∪ H contains 
only normal rules, choice rules and constraints), and the program can be constructed in polynomial time, this means that 
deciding veriﬁcation for I L Pb is in NP .
It remains to show that deciding veriﬁcation is NP -hard. We do this by showing that deciding satisﬁability for any ASP 
program P containing normal rules, choice rules and constraints can be reduced polynomially to deciding veriﬁcation for an 
I L Pb task. Consider the I L Pb task Tb = 〈P , ∅, 〈∅, ∅〉〉. Let H = ∅. H ∈ I L Pb(Tb) if and only if there is an answer set of P ∪ H , 
and hence, if and only if P is satisﬁable. 
Proposition 4. Deciding the satisﬁability of a general I L Pb task is NP-complete.
Proof. First we will show that deciding the satisﬁability of a general I L Pb task is in NP . We do this by mapping an arbitrary 
task T = 〈B, SM , 〈E+, E−〉〉 to an ASP program whose answer sets can be mapped to the solutions of T . This program will 
be satisﬁable if and only if T is satisﬁable and as the program is aggregate stratiﬁed, checking whether the program is 
satisﬁable is in NP . Hence, if we can construct such a program then we will have proved that deciding satisﬁability for 
I L Pb is in NP .
For each Ri ∈ SM we deﬁne a new atom in_hRi . Also, let meta(Ri) be the rule Ri with the additional atom in_hRi
added to the body.
We deﬁne the meta encoding Tmeta as follows:
Tmeta = B ∪ {meta(Ri) | Ri ∈ SM} ∪ { 0{in_hR1 , . . . ,in_hR|SM | }|SM|. }
∪ {:- not e. | e ∈ E+} ∪ {:- e. | e ∈ E−}
For any answer set A, let M−1(A) = {Ri | Ri ∈ SM , in_hRi ∈ A}.
A ∈ AS(Tmeta) if and only if (A\{in_hRi | Ri ∈ SM}) ∈ AS(B ∪M−1(A) ∪ {:- not e. | e ∈ E+} ∪ {:- e. | e ∈ E−}). (This 
can be seen by using the splitting set theorem, with {in_hRi | Ri ∈ SM} as the splitting set.)
Hence A ∈ AS(Tmeta) if and only if ∃H ⊆ SM such that H =M−1(A), (A\{in_hRi | Ri ∈ SM}) ∈ AS(B ∪H) and A respects 
the examples.
Hence Tmeta is satisﬁable if and only if ∃H ⊆ SM such that ∃A ∈ AS(B ∪ H) such that A respects the examples. This is 
the case if and only if T is satisﬁable.
It remains to show that deciding the satisﬁability of a general I L Pb task is NP -hard. Deciding the satisﬁability of a 
normal logic program is NP -hard, so demonstrating that a deciding the satisﬁability of a normal program P can be mapped 
to a I L Pb task is suﬃcient.
Let P be any normal logic program. Let T be the I L Pb task 〈P , ∅, 〈∅, ∅〉〉. T is satisﬁable if and only if ∃H ⊆ ∅ such that 
∃A ∈ AS(P ∪ H) such that ∅ ⊆ A and A ∩ ∅ = ∅. This is true if and only if P is satisﬁable.
Hence, deciding the satisﬁability of a general I L Pb task is NP -complete. 
Proposition 5. Deciding veriﬁcation for I L P sLAS is a member of DP .
Proof. Checking whether H is an inductive solution of an I L P sLAS task T = 〈B, SM , 〈E+, E−〉〉 can be achieved by mapping 
T to two aggregate stratiﬁed ASP programs P+ and P− , such that H ∈ I L P LAS (T ) if and only if P+ bravely entails an atom 
and P− cautiously an atom.
1. Let n be the integer |E+|.
For any integer i ∈ [1, n], let f i be a function mapping the atoms a in B ∪ H to new atoms ai . We extend the notation 
to allow f i to act on ASP programs (substituting all atoms in the program).
Let P+ be the program:{
f i(B ∪ H) ∪
{
covered(i):- fi(einc1 ), . . . ,fi(e
inc
m ),
not fi(eexc1 ), . . . ,not fi(e
exc
o ).
}∣∣∣∣ei = 〈{einc1 , . . . , eincm }, {eexc1 , . . . , eexco }〉 ∈ E+
}
P+ can be split into n sub programs P1 . . . Pn where each program Pi contains the rules containing the atoms generated 
by f i , plus the rule for covered(i).
As the atoms in each sub program are disjoint from the atoms of all other subprograms, AS(P+) = {A1 ∪ . . .∪ An | A1 ∈
AS(P1), . . . , An ∈ AS(Pn)}. (This follows from applying the splitting set theorem n − 1 times).
For each i ∈ [1, n], Pi |=b covered(i) if and only if ∃A ∈ B ∪ H such that A extends ei (where ei is the ith posi-
tive example). Hence P+ ∪ {covered:- covered(1), . . . ,covered(n).} |=b covered if and only if all the positive 
examples are covered. Therefore, checking whether all the positive examples are covered is in NP by Corollary 1.
As checking that H ⊆ SM can be done in polynomial time, this means that checking both that H ∈ SM and all the 
positive examples are covered is in NP .
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B ∪ H ∪ {covered:- not neg_violated.}⋃{ neg_violated:- einc1 , . . . ,eincm ,
not eexc1 , . . . ,not e
exc
o .
∣∣∣∣〈{einc1 , . . . , eincm }, {eexc1 , . . . , eexco }〉 ∈ E−
}
P− |=c covered if and only if A ∈ AS(B ∪ H) such that ∃e− ∈ E− such that A extends e− . Hence checking that all 
negative examples are covered is in co-NP by Lemma 1.
Hence as H ∈ I L P sLAS (T ) if and only if H ⊆ SM , all the positive examples are covered and all the negative examples are 
covered, verifying that H ∈ I L P sLAS(T ) can be reduced to checking one problem in NP and another problem in co-NP . This 
means that verifying a hypothesis is a solution of an I L P sLAS task is in DP . 
Proposition 6. Deciding veriﬁcation for I L Pc is DP-hard.
Proof. To prove that veriﬁcation that a hypothesis is a solution of an I L Pc task is DP -hard, we must prove that any problem 
in DP can be reduced to the veriﬁcation task.
Let D be any arbitrary decision problem which is in DP .
By the deﬁnition of DP , this is the case if and only if there exist two decision problems D1 and D2 such that D1 is in 
NP , D2 is in co-NP and D returns yes if and only if both D1 and D2 return yes.
By Lemma 1 and Corollary 1, this is the case if and only if there are two programs P1 and P2 and two atoms a1 and 
a2 such that both P1 |=b a1 and P2 |=c a2 if and only if D returns yes. Without loss of generality we can assume that the 
atoms in P1 (together with a1) are disjoint from the atoms in P2 (together with a2).
Take Tc to be the I L Pc task 〈B, SM , 〈E+, E−〉〉, where the individual components of the task are deﬁned as follows:
• B = P1 ∪ append(P2, a3) ∪ {:- not a1. 0{a3}1. a2:- not a3.} (where we assume a3 to be a new atom and 
append(P , a) to add the atom a to the body of all rules in P )
• SM = ∅
• E+ = {a2}
• E− = ∅
∅ ∈ I L Pc(Tc) if and only if (P1 ∪ {:- not a1.}) is satisﬁable and append(P2, a3) ∪ {0{a3}1. a2:- not a3.} |=c a2 . 
This is the case as the two subprograms P1 ∪ {:- not a1.} and append(P2, a3) ∪ {0{a3}1. a2:- not a3.} are disjoint, 
and the latter is guaranteed to be satisﬁable (it will always have the answer set {a2}).
Hence ∅ ∈ I L Pc(Tc) if and only if P1 |=b a1 , and P2 |=c a2 . But this is the case if and only if D returns yes.
Hence any problem in DP can be reduced to verifying that a hypothesis is an inductive solution of an I L Pc task.
Hence veriﬁcation for I L Pc is DP -hard. 
Proposition 7. Deciding satisﬁability for I L P sLAS is in 
P
2 .
Proof. Given an I L P sLAS task T = 〈B, SM , 〈E+, E−〉〉, we show that a non-deterministic Turing Machine with access to an 
NP oracle could check satisﬁability of T in polynomial time.
A non-deterministic Turing Machine can have |SM | choices to make (corresponding to selecting each rule as part of the 
hypothesis). This hypothesis can then be veriﬁed in polynomial time using an N P oracle, with two queries similar to the 
NP query and (the complement of) the co-NP query in Proposition 5, answering yes if and only if the ﬁrst query returned 
yes and the second query returned no.
Such a Turing Machine would terminate answering yes if and only if the task is satisﬁable (as there is a path through 
the Turing Machine which answers yes if and only if there is an hypothesis in SM which is an inductive solution of the 
task).
Hence, deciding the existence of a solution for an I L P sLAS task is in 
P
2 . 
Proposition 8. Deciding satisﬁability for I L Pc is P2 -hard.
Proof. We show this by reducing a known P2 -complete problem (deciding the existence of an answer set for a ground 
disjunctive logic program [55]) to an I L Pc task.
Take any ground disjunctive logic program P . We will deﬁne an I L Pc task T (P ) which has a solution if and only if P
has an answer set.
Let Atoms be the set of atoms in P . Let P ′ be the program constructed by replacing each negative literal not a with the 
literal not in_as(a) (where in_as is a new predicate) and replacing each head h1 ∨ . . . ∨ hm with the counting aggregate 
1{h1, . . . , hm}m (empty heads are mapped to 1{}0 - this is equivalent to ⊥).
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SM = {in_as(a) | a ∈ Atoms}
E+ = ∅
E− = {not_minimal}
This task has a solution if there exists an H ⊆ SM such that B ∪ H is satisﬁable and no answer set of B ∪ H contains 
not_minimal.




⎩1{h1, . . . ,hm}m:- b1, . . . ,bn
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1{h1, . . . ,hm}m:- b1, . . . ,bn,
not in_as(c1), . . . ,not in_as(co).
∈ P ′,





such that A ⊆ {a | in_as(a) ∈ H} and no answer set of B ∪ H contains not_minimal.




⎩1{h1, . . . ,hm}m:- b1, . . . ,bn
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1{h1, . . . ,hm}m:- b1, . . . ,bn,
not in_as(c1), . . . ,not in_as(co).
∈ P ′,





such that A = {a | in_as(a) ∈ H} and there is no strict subset of A which is also an answer set (or there would be an answer 
set of B ∪ H which contains not_minimal).
⇔ ∃H ⊆ SM st {a | in_as(a) ∈ H} is a minimal model of⎧⎨
⎩h1 ∨ . . . ∨ hm:- b1, . . . ,bn
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1{h1, . . . ,hm}m:- b1, . . . ,bn,
not in_as(c1), . . . ,not in_as(co).
∈ P ′,
{in_as(c1), . . . , in_as(co)} ∩ H = ∅
⎫⎬
⎭
⇔ ∃H ⊆ SM st {a | in_as(a) ∈ H} is a minimal model of⎧⎨
⎩h1 ∨ . . . ∨ hm:- b1, . . . ,bn
∣∣∣∣∣∣
h1 ∨ . . . ∨ hm:- b1, . . . ,bn,
not c1, . . . ,not co.
∈ P ,
{in_as(c1), . . . , in_as(co)} ∩ H = ∅
⎫⎬
⎭
⇔ ∃A ⊆ Atoms st A is a minimal model of⎧⎨
⎩h1 ∨ . . . ∨ hm:- b1, . . . ,bn
∣∣∣∣∣∣
h1 ∨ . . . ∨ hm:- b1, . . . ,bn,
not c1, . . . ,not co.
∈ P ,
{c1, . . . , co} ∩ A = ∅
⎫⎬
⎭
⇔ ∃A ⊆ Atoms such that A is a minimal model of P A
⇔ ∃A ⊆ Atoms such that A an answer set of P .
⇔ P is satisﬁable.
Hence, deciding whether a disjunctive logic program is satisﬁable can in general be mapped to the decision problem of 
checking the existence of solutions of a learning from answer sets task.
Therefore, deciding the existence of solutions of a ground I L Pc task is P2 -hard. 
A.2. Proofs from Section 5
Proposition 12. For any programs P1 and P2 , Eb(P1) ⊆ Eb(P2) if and only if AS(P1) ⊆ AS(P2).
Proof.
• Assume that AS(P1) ⊆ AS(P2)
⇔ ∀A ∈ AS(P1), A ∈ AS(P2).
Assume c = i1 ∧ . . . ∧ im,∧not e1, . . . ,not en ∈ Eb(P1). Then there must be an answer set A of P1 which contains 
all of the i’s and none of the e’s. Hence, there is also such an answer set of P2 which contains all of the i’s and none 
of the e’s. Hence, c ∈ Eb(P2).
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Let L be the set HBP1 ∪ HBP2 .
As A ∈ AS(P1), c = i1 ∧ . . . ∧ im,∧not e1, . . . ,not en ∈ Eb(P1), where the i’s are the set of atoms in A and the e’s 
are the set of atoms in L\A. As c ∈ Eb(P1), c ∈ Eb(P2) and hence there is an answer set A′ of P2 which contains each 
i ∈ A but no atom e ∈L\A, and hence as HBP2 ⊆L, A′ = A. Hence A ∈ AS(P2). 
Proposition 13. D11(I L Pb) =
{〈B, H1, H2〉∣∣ AS(B ∪ H1) AS(B ∪ H2)} .
Proof. We prove this by showing that D11(I L Pb) =
{〈B, H1, H2〉∣∣Eb(B ∪ H1) Eb(B ∪ H2)}, which is equal to the set {〈B, H1, H2〉∣∣AS(B ∪ H1) AS(B ∪ H2)} by Proposition 12.
• We ﬁrst show that if 〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈D11(I L Pb) then there must be a conjunction in Eb(B ∪ H1) that is not in Eb(B ∪ H2).
As 〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈D11(I L Pb), there is an I L Pb task T = 〈B, 〈{i1, . . . , im}, {e1, . . . , en}〉〉 such that H1 ∈ I L Pb(T ) and H2 /∈
I L Pb(T ).
Hence, there must be an answer set of B ∪ H1 such that {i1, . . . , im} ⊆ A and {e1, . . . , em} ∩ A = ∅, but no such answer 
set of B ∪ H2.
Hence the conjunction c = i1 ∧ . . . ∧ im ∧ not e1 ∧ . . . ∧ not en ∈ Eb(B ∪ H1) but c /∈ Eb(B ∪ H2).
• Next we show that if there exists a conjunction c = i1 ∧ . . .∧ im ∧not e1 ∧ . . .∧not en such that c ∈ Eb(B ∪ H1) but 
c /∈ Eb(B ∪ H2), then 〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈D11(I L Pb).
Assume that there is such a conjunction c. Then B ∪ H1 has an answer set that extends 〈{i1, . . . , im}, {e1, . . . , en}〉 and 
B ∪ H2 does not. Hence H1 ∈ I L Pb(〈B, 〈{i1, . . . , im}, {e1, . . . , en}〉〉) but H2 /∈ I L Pb(〈B, 〈{i1, . . . , im}, {e1, . . . , en}〉〉). So 
〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈D11(I L Pb). 
Proposition 14. D11(I L Pb) =D11(I L Psm).
Proof.
• First we show that D11(I L Pb) ⊆ D11(I L Psm). Assume 〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈ D11(I L Pb). Then there is a task Tb = 〈B, 〈E+, E−〉〉
such that H1 ∈ I L Pb(Tb) and H2 /∈ I L Pb(Tb). Let Tsm = 〈B, {〈E+, E−〉}〉. H1 ∈ I L Psm(Tsm) but H2 /∈ I L Psm(Tsm). Hence, 
〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈D11(I L Psm).
• Next we show that D11(I L Pb) ⊇D11(I L Psm). Assume 〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈D11(I L Psm). There must be a task Tsm = 〈B, {〈E+1 , E−1 〉,
. . . , 〈E+n , E−n 〉}〉 such that H1 ∈ I L Psm(Tsm) and H2 /∈ I L Psm(Tsm). There must be at least one partial interpretation 〈E+i , E−i 〉 such that there is an answer set A of B ∪ H1 such that E+i ⊆ A and E−i ∩ A = ∅ and there is no such an-
swer set of B ∪ H2. Hence, letting Tb = 〈B, 〈E+i , E−i 〉〉, H1 ∈ I L Pb(Tb) but H2 /∈ I L Pb(Tb). So 〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈D11(I L Pb). 
Proposition 15. D11(I L Pc) =
{
〈B, H1, H2〉




• First we show that for any 〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈D11(I L Pc), AS(B ∪ H1) = ∅ and either AS(B ∪ H2) = ∅ or Ec(B ∪ H1)  Ec(B ∪
H2).
Let 〈B, H1, H2〉 be an arbitrary element of D11(I L Pc). As H1 ∈ I L Pc(Tc), AS(B ∪ H1) = ∅. Assume that Ec(B ∪ H1) ⊆
Ec(B ∪H2). We must show that AS(B ∪H2) = ∅. As 〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈D11(I L Pc), ∃Tc = 〈B, 〈E+, E−〉〉 such that H1 ∈ I L Pc(Tc)
and H2 /∈ I L Pc(Tc).
As H1 ∈ I L Pc(Tc), ∀A ∈ AS(B ∪ H1) : E+ ⊆ A and E− ∩ A = ∅, hence the conjunction E+ ∧ {not e− | e− ∈ E−} ∈ Ec(B ∪
H1); hence by our initial assumption that Ec(B ∪ H1) ⊆ Ec(B ∪ H2), the conjunction is also in Ec(B ∪ H2); hence, 
∀A ∈ AS(B ∪ H2), E+ ⊆ A and E− ∩ A = ∅. But as H2 /∈ I L Pc(Tc) this means that AS(B ∪ H2) = ∅.
• We now show that for any B , H1 and H2, if AS(B ∪ H1) = ∅ ∧ (AS(B ∪ H2) = ∅ ∨ Ec(B ∪ H1)  Ec(B ∪ H2), then 
〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈D11(I L Pc).
Case 1: AS(B ∪ H1) = ∅ ∧ AS(B ∪ H2) = ∅.
Consider the task Tc = 〈B, 〈∅, ∅〉〉. H1 ∈ I L Pc(Tc) as AS(B ∪ H1) = ∅ and ∀A ∈ AS(B ∪ H1), ∅ ⊆ A and A ∩ ∅ = ∅. 
H2 /∈ I L Pc(Tc) as AS(B ∪ H2) = ∅.
Case 2: AS(B ∪ H1) = ∅ ∧ ∃(c = i1 ∧ . . . ∧ im ∧ not e1 ∧ . . . ∧ en) ∈ Ec(B ∪ H1) such that c /∈ Ec(B ∪ H2).
Consider the task Tc = 〈B, 〈{i1, . . . , im}, {e1, . . . , en}〉〉. H1 ∈ I L Pc(Tc), but H2 /∈ I L Pc(Tc). 
Proposition 16. D1(I L P LAS ) = {〈B, H1, H2〉|AS(B ∪ H1) = AS(B ∪ H2)}1
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• We ﬁrst show that D11(I L P LAS) ⊆ {〈B, H1, H2〉|AS(B ∪ H1) = AS(B ∪ H2)}. For any 〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈D11(I L P LAS) there is an 
I L P LAS task T = 〈B, 〈E+, E−〉〉 such that H1 ∈ I L P LAS(T ) and H2 /∈ I L P LAS (T ).
Case 1: ∃e ∈ E+ such that ∀A ∈ AS(B ∪ H2), A does not extend e.
As H1 ∈ I L P LAS(T ), ∃A′ ∈ AS(B ∪ H1) such that A′ extends e. Hence as A′ cannot be in AS(B ∪ H2), AS(B ∪
H1) = AS(B ∪ H2).
Case 2: ∃e ∈ E− , ∃A ∈ AS(B ∪ H2) such that A extends e.
As H1 ∈ I L P LAS(T ), ∀A′ ∈ AS(B ∪ H1), A′ does not extend e. Hence A cannot be in AS(B ∪ H1) and so AS(B ∪
H1) = AS(B ∪ H2).
• It remains to show that D11(I L P LAS) ⊇ {〈B, H1, H2〉|AS(B ∪ H1) = AS(B ∪ H2)}. Take B , H1, H2 to be any ASP programs 
such that AS(B ∪ H1) = AS(B ∪ H2)
Let L be the set of atoms which appear in answer sets of B ∪ H1 and B ∪ H2.
Case 1: ∃A ∈ AS(B ∪ H1) such that A /∈ AS(B ∪ H2)
Let eA = 〈A, L\A〉. A is the only interpretation in AS(B ∪ H1) or AS(B ∪ H2) which extends eA (as eA is 
completely deﬁned over the atoms in L). Hence, there is an answer set of B ∪ H1 which extends eA , but no 
such answer set of B ∪ H2.
Hence, H1 ∈ I L P LAS (〈B, 〈{eA}, ∅〉〉), but H2 /∈ I L P LAS (〈B, 〈{eA}, ∅〉〉). So 〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈D11(I L P LAS).
Case 2: ∃A ∈ AS(B ∪ H2) such that A /∈ AS(B ∪ H1)
Let eA = 〈A, L\A〉. A is the only interpretation in AS(B ∪ H1) or AS(B ∪ H2) which extends eA . Hence, there is 
no answer set of B ∪ H1 which extends eA , but there is such an answer set of B ∪ H2.
Hence, H1 ∈ I L P LAS (〈B, 〈∅, {eA}〉〉), but H2 /∈ I L P LAS (〈B, 〈∅, {eA}〉〉). So 〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈D11(I L P LAS). 
Proposition 17. D11(I L P LO AS) =
{
〈B, H1, H2〉




• We ﬁrst show that D11(I L P LO AS ) ⊆ {〈B, H1, H2〉|AS(B ∪ H1) = AS(B ∪ H2) or ord(B ∪ H1) = ord(B ∪ H2)}. For any 
〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈ D11(I L P LO AS ) there is an I L P LO AS task T = 〈B, 〈E+, E−, Ob, Oc〉〉 such that H1 ∈ I L P LO AS (T ) and 
H2 /∈ I L P LO AS (T ).
Case 1: ∃e ∈ E+ such that ∀A ∈ AS(B ∪ H2), A does not extend e.
As H1 ∈ I L P LO AS (T ), ∃A′ ∈ AS(B ∪ H1) such that A′ extends e. Hence as A′ cannot be in AS(B ∪ H2), AS(B ∪
H1) = AS(B ∪ H2).
Case 2: ∃e ∈ E− , ∃A ∈ AS(B ∪ H2) such that A extends e.
As H1 ∈ I L P LO AS (T ), ∀A′ ∈ AS(B ∪ H1), A′ does not extend e. Hence, A cannot be in AS(B ∪ H1) and so AS(B ∪
H1) = AS(B ∪ H2).
Case 3: ∃〈e1, e2, op〉 ∈ Ob which is covered by H1 but not H2.
Assume AS(B ∪ H1) = AS(B ∪ H2). ∃A1, A2 ∈ AS(B ∪ H1) such that A1 extends e1, A2 extends e2 and 
〈A1, A2, op〉 ∈ ord(B ∪ H1) as H1 covers the ordering example. 〈A1, A2, op〉 /∈ ord(B ∪ H2) as H2 does not cover 
the ordering example; and hence, ord(B ∪ H1) = ord(B ∪ H2).
Case 4: ∃〈e1, e2, op〉 ∈ Oc which is covered by H1 but not H2.
Assume AS(B ∪ H1) = AS(B ∪ H2). ∃A1, A2 ∈ AS(B ∪ H2) such that A1 extends e1, A2 extends e2 and 
〈A1, A2, op〉 /∈ ord(B ∪ H2) as H2 does not cover the ordering example. 〈A1, A2, op〉 ∈ ord(B ∪ H1) as H1 does 
cover the ordering example; and hence, ord(B ∪ H1) = ord(B ∪ H2).
Hence, in all cases, either AS(B ∪ H1) = AS(B ∪ H2 or ord(B ∪ H1) = ord(B ∪ H2).
• It remains to show that D11(I L P LO AS ) ⊇ {〈B, H1, H2〉|AS(B ∪ H1) = AS(B ∪ H2) or ord(B ∪ H1) = ord(B ∪ H2)}. Take B , 
H1, H2 to be any ASP programs such that AS(B ∪ H1) = AS(B ∪ H2) or ord(B ∪ H1) = ord(B ∪ H2).
Let L be the set of literals which appear in answer sets of B ∪ H1 and B ∪ H2.
Case 1: AS(B ∪ H1) = AS(B ∪ H2)
〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈ D11(I L P LAS ) (by Proposition 16). Hence, there is an I L P LAS task TLAS = 〈B, 〈E+, E−〉〉 such that 
H1 ∈ I L P LAS(TLAS ) and H2 /∈ I L P LAS (TLAS). Let TLO AS = 〈B, 〈E+, E−, ∅, ∅〉〉. H1 ∈ I L P LO AS (TLO AS) and H2 /∈
I L P LO AS(TLO AS ).
Case 2: AS(B ∪ H1) = AS(B ∪ H2) but ord(B ∪ H1) = ord(B ∪ H2)
∃A1, A2 ∈ AS(B ∪ H1) (which is equal to AS(B ∪ H2)) such that there is a binary operator op such that 
〈A1, A2, op〉 ∈ ord(B ∪ H1) but 〈A1, A2, op〉 /∈ ord(B ∪ H2).6 Let e1 = 〈A1, L\A1〉 and e2 = 〈A2, L\A2〉 (where L is 
6 Note that there is no need to consider the case where there is a tuple 〈A1, A2, op〉 ∈ ord(B ∪ H2) such that 〈A1, A2, op〉 /∈ ord(B ∪ H1), as in this case 
〈A1, A2, op−1〉 ∈ ord(B ∪ H1) and 〈A1, A2, op−1〉 /∈ ord(B ∪ H2) (where <−1 is ≥, >−1 is ≤, =−1 is =, ≥−1 is <, ≤−1 is > and =−1 is =).
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∅〉〉. H1 ∈ I L P LO AS (TLO AS ) and H2 /∈ I L P LO AS (TLO AS ).
Hence, in both cases 〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈D11(I L P LO AS ). 
Proposition 18. D11(I L P contextLO AS ) =
{
〈B, H1, H2〉
∣∣∣∣ B ∪ H1 ≡
s B ∪ H2 or




• We ﬁrst show that D11(I L P contextLO AS ) ⊆
{
〈B, H1, H2〉
∣∣∣∣ B ∪ H1 ≡
s B ∪ H2 or
∃C ∈ASPch st ord(B ∪ H1 ∪ C) = ord(B ∪ H2 ∪ C)
}
. For any
〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈D11(I L P contextLO AS ) there is an I L P contextLO AS task T = 〈B, 〈E+, E−, Ob, Oc〉〉 such that H1 ∈ I L P contextLO AS (T ) and 
H2 /∈ I L P contextLO AS (T ).
Case 1: ∃〈e, C〉 ∈ E+ such that ∀A ∈ AS(B ∪ H2 ∪ C), A does not extend e.
As H1 ∈ I L P contextLO AS (T ), ∃A′ ∈ AS(B ∪ H1 ∪ C) such that A′ extends e. Hence, as A′ cannot be in AS(B ∪ H2 ∪ C), 
AS(B ∪ H1 ∪ C) = AS(B ∪ H2 ∪ C). Hence, B ∪ H1 ≡s B ∪ H2.
Case 2: ∃〈e, C〉 ∈ E− , ∃A ∈ AS(B ∪ H2 ∪ C) such that A extends e.
As H1 ∈ I L P contextLO AS (T ), ∀A′ ∈ AS(B ∪ H1 ∪ C), A′ does not extend e. Hence, A cannot be in AS(B ∪ H1 ∪ C) and 
so AS(B ∪ H1 ∪ C) = AS(B ∪ H2 ∪ C). Hence, B ∪ H1 ≡s B ∪ H2.
Case 3: ∃〈〈e1, C1〉, 〈e2, C2〉, op〉 ∈ Ob which is covered by H1 but not H2.
Assume that B ∪ H1 ≡s B ∪ H2.
Let S be the set AS(B ∪H1 ∪C1) ∪ AS(B ∪H1 ∪C2) (which is equal to the set AS(B ∪ H2 ∪C1) ∪ AS(B ∪H2 ∪C2)
as B ∪ H1 ≡s B ∪ H2). ∃A1 ∈ AS(B ∪ H1 ∪ C1), A2 ∈ AS(B ∪ H1 ∪ C2) such that A1 extends e1, A2 extends e2 and 
〈A1, A2, op〉 ∈ ord(B ∪ H1, S) as H1 covers the ordering example. 〈A1, A2, op〉 /∈ ord(B ∪ H2, S) as H2 does not 
cover the ordering example.
Let C be the ASPch program append(C1, a1) ∪ append(C2, a2) ∪ {1{a1,a2}1.} (where a1 and a2 are new 
atoms and append(P , a) appends the atom a to the body of each rule in P ). AS(B ∪ H1 ∪ C) = {A ∪ {a1} | A ∈
AS(B ∪ H1 ∪ C1)} ∪ {A ∪ {a2} | A ∈ AS(B ∪ H1 ∪ C2)}, and hence, t = 〈A1 ∪ {a1}, A2 ∪ {a2}, op〉 ∈ ord(B ∪ H1 ∪ C), 
but t /∈ ord(B ∪ H2 ∪ C).
Hence, ∃C ∈ASPch such that ord(B ∪ H1 ∪ C) = ord(B ∪ H2 ∪ C).
Case 4: ∃〈e1, e2, op〉 ∈ Oc which is covered by H1 but not H2.
Assume that B ∪ H1 ≡s B ∪ H2.
Let S be the set AS(B ∪H1 ∪C1) ∪ AS(B ∪H1 ∪C2) (which is equal to the set AS(B ∪ H2 ∪C1) ∪ AS(B ∪H2 ∪C2)
as B ∪ H1 ≡s B ∪ H2). ∃A1 ∈ AS(B ∪ H1 ∪ C1), A2 ∈ AS(B ∪ H1 ∪ C2) such that A1 extends e1, A2 extends e2
and 〈A1, A2, op〉 /∈ ord(B ∪ H2, S) as H2 does not cover the ordering example. 〈A1, A2, op〉 ∈ ord(B ∪ H1, S) as 
H1 does cover the ordering example.
Let C be the ASPch program append(C1, a1) ∪ append(C2, a2) ∪ {1{a1,a2}1.} (where a1 and a2 are new 
atoms and append(P , a) appends the atom a to the body of each rule in P ). AS(B ∪ H1 ∪ C) = {A ∪ {a1} | A ∈
AS(B ∪ H1 ∪ C1)} ∪ {A ∪ {a2} | A ∈ AS(B ∪ H1 ∪ C2)}, and hence, t = 〈A1 ∪ {a1}, A2 ∪ {a2}, op〉 ∈ ord(B ∪ H1 ∪ C), 
but t /∈ ord(B ∪ H2 ∪ C).
Hence, ∃C ∈ASPch such that ord(B ∪ H1 ∪ C) = ord(B ∪ H2 ∪ C).
Hence, in all cases, either B ∪ H1 ≡s B ∪ H2 or ∃C ∈ASPch such that ord(B ∪ H1 ∪ C) = ord(B ∪ H2 ∪ C).
• It remains to show that D11(I L P LO AS ) ⊇ {〈B, H1, H2〉|AS(B ∪ H1) = AS(B ∪ H2) or ord(B ∪ H1) = ord(B ∪ H2)}. Take B , 
H1, H2 to be any ASP programs such that AS(B ∪ H1) = AS(B ∪ H2) or ord(B ∪ H1) = ord(B ∪ H2).
Case 1: B ∪ H1 ≡s B ∪ H2
There must be a program C such that AS(B ∪ H1 ∪ C) = AS(B ∪ H2 ∪ C).
Case i: ∃A ∈ AS(B ∪ H1 ∪ C) such that A /∈ AS(B ∪ H2 ∪ C).
Let L be the set of atoms in the answer sets of B ∪ H1 ∪ C and B ∪ H2 ∪ C and let eA be the partial 
interpretation 〈A, L\A〉. Then B ∪ H1 ∪ C has an answer set that extends eA , but B ∪ H2 ∪ C does not, 
and hence, H1 ∈ I L P contextLO AS (〈B, SM , 〈{〈eA, C〉}, ∅, ∅, ∅〉〉) but H2 is not.
Case ii: ∃A ∈ AS(B ∪ H2 ∪ C) such that A /∈ AS(B ∪ H1 ∪ C).
Let L be the set of atoms in the answer sets of B ∪ H1 ∪ C and B ∪ H2 ∪ C and let eA be the partial 
interpretation 〈A, L\A〉. Then B ∪ H2 ∪ C has an answer set that extends eA , but B ∪ H1 ∪ C does not, 
and hence, H1 ∈ I L P contextLO AS (〈B, SM , 〈∅, {〈eA, C〉}, ∅, ∅〉〉) but H2 is not.
Case 2: B ∪ H1 ≡s B ∪ H2 but ∃C ∈ASPch such that ord(B ∪ H1 ∪ C) = ord(B ∪ H2 ∪ C)
∃A1, A2 ∈ AS(B ∪ H1 ∪ C) (which is equal to AS(B ∪ H2 ∪ C)) such that there is a binary operator op such 
that 〈A1, A2, op〉 ∈ ord(B ∪ H1 ∪ C) but 〈A1, A2, op〉 /∈ ord(B ∪ H2 ∪ C). Let e1 = 〈A1, L\A1〉 and e2 = 〈A2, L\A2〉
(where L is the set of atoms in the answer sets of B ∪ H1 ∪ C ). Consider the I L P contextLO AS task T contextLO AS =〈B, 〈{e1, e2}, ∅, {〈〈e1, C〉, 〈e2, C〉, op〉}, ∅〉〉. H1 ∈ I L P contextLO AS (T contextLO AS ) and H2 /∈ I L P contextLO AS (T contextLO AS ).
Hence, in both cases 〈B, H1, H2〉 ∈D11(I L P contextLO AS ). 
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{〈B, H, {H1, . . . , Hn}〉∣∣〈B, H, H1〉, . . . , 〈B, H, Hn〉 ∈D11(F)}.
Proof.
• We ﬁrst show that D1m(F) ⊆
{〈B, H, {H1, . . . , Hn}〉∣∣〈B, H, H1〉, . . . , 〈B, H, Hn〉 ∈D11(F)}. Take an arbitrary
〈B, H, S〉 ∈ D1m(F). We must show that 〈B, H, S〉 ∈
{〈B, H, {H1, . . . , Hn}〉∣∣〈B, H, H1〉, . . . , 〈B, H, Hn〉 ∈D11(F)}. To do 
this, we need to show that ∀H ′ ∈ S , 〈B, H, H ′〉 ∈D11(F).
Take an arbitrary H ′ ∈ S . It remains to show that 〈B, H, H ′〉 ∈ D11(F). By deﬁnition of D1m(F), there must be some 
subset S ′ ⊆ S such that H ′ ∈ S ′ and 〈B, H, S ′〉 ∈D1m(F). Hence, ∃TF such that H ∈ I L PF (TF ) and S ′ ∩ I L PF (TF ) = ∅. 
Hence, as H ′ ∈ S ′ , 〈B, H, H ′〉 ∈D11(F).
• We now show that D1m(F) ⊇
{〈B, H, {H1, . . . , Hn}〉∣∣〈B, H, H1〉, . . . , 〈B, H, Hn〉 ∈D11(F)}. Take an arbitrary 〈B, H,
{H1, . . . , Hn}〉 ∈
{〈B, H, {H1, . . . , Hn}〉∣∣〈B, H, H1〉, . . . , 〈B, H, Hn〉 ∈D11(F)}. For each i ∈ [1..n], 〈B, H, Hi〉 ∈ D11(F), and 
hence, 〈B, H, {Hi}〉 ∈D1m(F). Hence, by deﬁnition of D1m(F), 〈B, H, {H1, . . . , Hn}〉 ∈D1m(F). 
Proposition 20. I L Pc , I L Psm, I L P LAS , I L P LO AS and I L P contextLO AS all have closed one-to-many-distinguishability.
Proof.
1. Consider any two I L Pc tasks, T 1c = 〈B, 〈E+1 , E−1 〉〉 and T 2c = 〈B, 〈E+2 , E−2 〉〉. Let T 3c = 〈B, 〈E+1 ∪ E+2 , E−1 ∪ E−2 〉〉.
H ∈ I L Pc(T 1c ) ∩ I L Pc(T 2c ) if and only if AS(B ∪ H) is non-empty and ∀A ∈ AS(B ∪ H): E+1 ⊆ A, E+2 ⊆ A, E−1 ∩ A = ∅ and 
E−2 ∩ A = ∅. This is the case if and only if (E+1 ∪ E+2 ) ⊆ A, and (E−1 ∪ E−2 ) ∩ A = ∅ which holds if an only if H ∈ I L Pc(T 3c ).
Hence, by Lemma 2, I L Pc has closed one-to-many-distinguishability.
2. For any tasks T 1sm = 〈B, {e11, . . . e1n}〉 and T 2sm = 〈B, {e21, . . . e2m}〉, let T 3sm = 〈B, {e11, . . . e1n, e21, . . . , e2m}〉. I L Psm(T 3sm) =
I L Psm(T 1sm) ∩ I L Psm(T 2sm).
Hence, by Lemma 2, I L Psm has closed one-to-many-distinguishability.
3. For any tasks T 1LAS = 〈B, 〈E+1 , E−1 〉〉 and T 2LAS = 〈B, 〈E+2 , E−2 〉〉, let T 3LAS = 〈B, 〈E+1 ∪ E+2 , E−1 ∪ E−2 〉〉. I L P LAS(T 3LAS) =
I L P LAS(T 1LAS ) ∩ I L P LAS(T 2LAS ).
Hence, by Lemma 2, I L P LAS has closed one-to-many-distinguishability.
4. For any tasks T 1LO AS = 〈B, 〈E+1 , E−1 , Ob1, Oc1〉〉 and T 2LO AS = 〈B, 〈E+2 , E−2 , Ob2, Oc2〉〉, let T 3LO AS = 〈B, 〈E+1 ∪ E+2 , E−1 ∪
E−2 , Ob1 ∪ Ob2, Oc1 ∪ Oc2〉〉. I L P LO AS (T 3LO AS) = I L P LO AS (T 1LO AS) ∩ I L P LO AS (T 2LO AS).
Hence, by Lemma 2, I L P LO AS has closed one-to-many-distinguishability.
5. For any tasks T1contextLO AS = 〈B, 〈E+1 , E−1 , Ob1, Oc1〉〉 and T2contextLO AS = 〈B, 〈E+2 , E−2 , Ob2, Oc2〉〉, let T3contextLO AS = 〈B, 〈E+1 ∪ E+2 , E−1 ∪
E−2 , Ob1 ∪ Ob2, Oc1 ∪ Oc2〉〉. I L P contextLO AS (T3contextLO AS ) = I L P contextLO AS (T1contextLO AS ) ∩ I L P contextLO AS (T2contextLO AS ).
Hence, by Lemma 2, I L P contextLO AS has closed one-to-many-distinguishability. 
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